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ABSTRACT 
 
U.S. FOREIGN AID IN AN AGE OF TERROR 
 
by 
 
Brendan Mark Morris 
 
Dr. Michele Kuenzi, Examination Committee Chair 
Assistant Professor of Political Science 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
Foreign aid has become a growing importance of U.S. foreign policy in the last few 
years. As the U.S. is committing more aid towards the developing world, questions over 
the purpose of this expansion of aid have emerged. While the traditional perspectives on 
the purpose of foreign aid of either serving the strategic interests of the donor or the 
development interest of the recipients are given as potential reasoning behind this 
allocation of aid, the impact of the U.S.’s involvement in the War on Terror may have 
more of a significant impact on the U.S.’s current foreign aid allocation. Foreign aid 
allocated to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) may have felt the greatest impact from the War on 
Terror, as the region has now been recognized for its geostrategic importance to the U.S. 
due to its high risk of instability and state failure. Looking at the potential determinants of 
U.S. foreign aid before and after the start of the War on Terror, this study asks whether 
this new security environment has had any profound effect on U.S. aid allocation to SSA. 
A multivariate panel regression with a partial fixed effects model is employed to identify 
the determinants of U.S. aid during these time periods. Differences in aid allocation that 
have been found between these two time periods suggest that the War on Terror has had a 
significant, yet limited, effect on U.S. foreign aid SSA. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the implementation of the Marshall Plan after the end of the Second World 
War, foreign aid1 has been an important part of the United States’s foreign policy 
(Lancaster, 1999: 83). This importance has grown within the last eight years, with U.S. 
foreign aid allocation reaching its highest levels since the 1960s, nearly double the 
amount allocated in the previous decade. The impact of the U.S.’s involvement in the 
War on Terror may have a significant impact on the U.S.’s current foreign aid allocation. 
Foreign aid allocated to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) may have felt the greatest impact 
from the War on Terror, with the region now being recognized for its strategic 
importance in protecting U.S. national security (Kraxberger, 2005). The threats which 
U.S. faces in the War on Terror have increased the U.S.’s focus on the dangers from 
failing and failed states, a political symptom which has plagued many SSA states since 
their independence. Foreign aid to SSA may have increased significantly to support 
development and to prevent terrorist groups from establishing bases to conduct 
operations within the region. Because foreign aid that has been allocated to SSA in the 
past has been allocated to further the strategic interests of the U.S. more than promoting 
the development of the recipients, it is important to ask how the U.S.’s foreign aid 
allocation to this region has been affected by the War on Terror.  
Questioning the impact of the War on Terror on U.S. foreign aid allocation to 
SSA is important for understanding the role foreign aid plays for the U.S. as well as the 
                                                 
1
 The term “foreign aid,” or simply “aid,” in this study will refer to Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) specified in the OECD statistical records. 
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U.S.’s foreign policy towards SSA. To undertake this task, this study will attempt to 
identify and compare the most significant determinants of the U.S.’s foreign aid 
allocation to SSA in the periods before and after the start of the War on Terror. The 
reasons why the U.S. allocates aid to SSA is especially interesting, as the region has 
traditionally been of little importance to the U.S.’s strategic interest and the last four 
decades of foreign aid to the region has not produced significant development results to 
permit the continuing of its allocation.  
The traditional perspectives on foreign aid explain aid allocation either around the 
donors’ egotistical interests or the donors’ altruistic concerns towards the recipients. 
According to these perspectives, the U.S. would either provide foreign aid to SSA in the 
hope of gaining some form of benefit to its economic, political, or security interests, or it 
would provide aid to the region based upon a sense of moral obligation to promote 
poverty alleviation. By introducing the potential effect that the War on Terror has on the 
U.S.’s foreign aid decisions to SSA in addition to these perspectives, one may develop a 
more refined understanding of the purpose of U.S. foreign aid in this new security 
environment. SSA contains many factors which makes it highly susceptible to the spread 
of terrorist movements (Cilliers, 2003). These factors include close proximity of the 
Middle East to the volatile Horn of Africa territory, the rise of Islamic terrorist groups 
connected to al Qaeda in parts of the region, a history of terrorist attacks targeted against 
SSA regimes and the U.S., and the potential for individuals to be recruited in the region 
to carry out attacks against the U.S. Reviewing these factors, one may see the dangers of 
terrorism within the region and the reasons why the U.S. would wish to focus on 
preventing and containing these dangers.  
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The War on Terror and Terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa 
The attacks on September 11, 2001 have been “widely interpreted to demonstrate 
beyond dispute that conflict and unrest in one part of the world could spill over and 
destroy the lives of thousands on the other side of the globe” (Abrahamsen, 2004: 678). 
Since the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. has been engaged in a global conflict against 
transnational terrorist organizations and states which sponsor and support such groups. 
Described as a “battle of arms and a battle of ideas,” the War on Terror under U.S. 
leadership has focused on several strategic goals, including: advancing effective 
democracies as the long-term antidote to the ideology of terrorism; preventing attacks by 
terrorist networks; denying weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to rogue states and 
terrorist allies who seek to use them; denying terrorists the support and sanctuary of 
rogue states; denying terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and 
launching pad for terror; and laying the foundations and building the institutions and 
structures needed to help ensure ultimate success in defeating terrorism. (National 
Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 2006:1).  
The strategy laid out above shows a focus for the U.S. in the War on Terror on not 
only engaging terrorist threats, but also developing regions to prevent terrorist groups 
from emerging in an area. Democracy in this strategy is listed as the long-term solution to 
preventing terrorism groups from arising. Earlier strategies for the U.S. during the 
beginning of the War on Terror list preventing weak states to fail as a critical strategy in 
preventing terrorism as well (U.S. National Security Strategy, 2002). Though the U.S. has 
a primary target in the War on Terror with al Qaeda, terrorist groups, especially radical 
Islamic groups, in many developing countries have been noted for their potential threat to 
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U.S. interests (Rabasa, 2009). SSA has been particularly recognized as a major battlefront 
in the War on Terror for the U.S. due to its weak states and connections to terrorism.  
Reviewing SSA’s connections with the terrorism, it is not a surprise that the U.S. 
has focused on the region’s importance to U.S. national security. As SSA contains 
territories with close proximity to the Middle East, the U.S. would have several reasons 
to be concerned with the spread of terrorist movements into the region. With porous 
borders throughout the region and cultural and religious ties between some of the SSA 
states and terrorist hotbeds such as Saudi Arabia and Yemen, the U.S. has labeled part of 
SSA, the Horn of Africa, as a frontline in the War on Terror (Lyman and Morrison, 
2004). The focus on the threat within the Horn of Africa can be seen with the U.S. 
conducting military operations throughout the region, training SSA states in 
counterterrorism as well as carrying out its own attacks against suspected terrorist targets. 
The establishment of African Command (AFRICOM) to serve as a regional military 
command for the U.S.’s operations in SSA is more evidence to the growing importance 
of the region in the battle against terrorism and signs that the U.S. may also be interested 
in using SSA as a base for its operations against threats within the Middle East.  
The existence of acting terrorist organizations throughout the region is another 
important factor to consider in regards to potential terrorist threats in SSA. Groups in the 
region, such as al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) and al-Shabaab based in Somalia, al-Qaeda in 
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Algeria and Mauritania, the Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA) in northern Uganda, and the People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) in 
South Africa, have conducted terrorist attacks against multiple targets. Of these particular 
groups, al-Shabaab and AQIM are both listed under the U.S. State Department’s Foreign 
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Terrorist Organization list (U.S. Department of State, 2010) with both groups having 
perceived links to al Qaeda. While it has been argued that these groups and other terrorist 
groups in SSA are focused on regional targets and politics and not the U.S. (Piombo, 
2007; Berschinski, 2007), previous attacks against the U.S. in the region represent key 
factors that could increase U.S. interest in SSA security.  
Table 1 below lists the number of terrorist attacks and causalities from attacks in 
SSA from 1991-2007. Of these attacks, the dual bombings of American embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the hotel bombing and the attempt to shoot down an 
Israeli airplane in Mombasa, Kenya in 2002 shows the existence of terrorist cells that are 
focused on attacking the U.S. and its allies. The fact that the perpetrators of the embassy 
attacks have connections to al Qaeda makes the potential threat of terrorism against the 
U.S. in the region even greater. Other links to al Qaeda, such as states providing safe 
havens for al Qaeda’s top leaders (such as Sudan for Osama bin Laden in the 1990s), 
financial support for the organization through illicit trade (such as al Qaeda’s connections 
to conflict diamonds in Sierra Leone; see Farah, 2002), and potential recruiting networks 
for al Qaeda within the region show the potential for SSA to be the next battlefront in the 
War on Terror.  
Counterterrorism through Foreign Aid 
While terrorism should be an obvious concern for the U.S. in regard to its foreign 
aid to SSA, it is important to look at the leading factors within the region that would 
influence the spread of terrorism and how the U.S. could us foreign aid to prevent this 
threat from spreading further. The threat of terrorism in SSA is based around “problems 
of poverty, limited infrastructure, poor education and health services, frequently slow and 
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Table 1 
 
 
sometimes volatile rates of economic growth, low levels of investment and high 
unemployment rates, and, in a number of cases, ethnic, religious, class, and regional 
cleavages and weak and corrupt governments” (Lancaster and Van Dusen, 2005: 1-2). As 
a USAID report notes, “these circumstances entrench poverty, nurture injustice, and fuel 
anger and alienation,” potentially leading individuals to violence and terrorism (USAID, 
2002).  
As the U.S. has identified development as one of its three pillars of national 
security(U.S. National Security Strategy, 2002), along with defense and diplomacy, 
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expanding development through increasing foreign aid to prevent states from failing may 
be considered to be a plausible strategy for the U.S. towards SSA. Development can help 
alleviate the threat of terrorism by providing support to economic, social, technical, and 
political dimensions of SSA states. By providing support to build up democratic 
institutions, improving access to education and healthcare, and taking effective measures 
against some of the region’s biggest epidemics, such as the spread of HIV/AIDS, U.S. 
foreign aid can build up the SSA’s states capabilities to improve security and prevent the 
rise of international terrorism in the region from occurring. 
Foreign aid may, however, have negative effects to the region. Since 1960, the 
U.S. has allocated over US$80 billion2 (OECD, 2010) in foreign aid to SSA. This foreign 
aid has been viewed by some to have produced few positive results in the area of 
development and has kept weak states and corrupt leaders in existence (Van de Wall, 
2001; Moyo, 2009). A major problem with the foreign aid that has been allocated to SSA 
in the past, especially during the Cold War, is that the foreign aid was allocated more on 
the interests of the U.S. than the interests of the SSA recipient states. Foreign aid 
allocated during this time has been described as having nothing to do with the region 
itself (Congressional Research Service, 2008: 12), as the U.S. ignored the realities of 
SSA’s political and economic situation (Kraxberger, 2005). The disregard of the realities 
of the SSA states and provision of aid to corrupt regimes contributed to the weakening or 
failure of many states.  
 Studies of U.S. foreign aid allocation during the Cold War have observed that the 
U.S.’s strategic interests have a greater impact on allocation decisions than the 
                                                 
2
 Constant 2008 US$  
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development interests of the recipients (Griffin and Enos, 1970; McKinlay and Little, 
1977; Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor, 1998). The end of the Cold War has been viewed as 
an opportunity for U.S. foreign aid to focus on the economic and political development of 
SSA and not follow just the strategic interest of the U.S. (Clough, 1992; Van de Walle, 
2001). If the U.S. is focused on preventing terrorism, then the U.S.’s allocation of aid 
should be influenced by factors related to the prevention of the emergence of failing and 
failed states and the development needs of the recipients. If the U.S.’s economic interests 
are found as the major determinants of its foreign aid, then one may assume that the U.S. 
is still not focusing on the dangers of instability within the region and is still following 
the traditional practices of its aid allocation. 
 
Methodology of the Study 
 In order to find whether the War on Terror has had an effect on U.S. foreign aid 
allocation, this study will examine the major determinants of U.S. foreign aid since the 
end of the Cold War and how they have changed since the start of the War on Terror. To 
test the main hypothesis that the War on Terror has had a profound effect on U.S. foreign 
aid allocation to SSA, this study will test the identified determinants of U.S. foreign aid 
before and after the start of the War on Terror. The time periods for the two analyses are 
1992-2000 and 2002-2008. As the War on Terror has been described as an important 
change in U.S. foreign policy (U.S. National Security Strategy, 2002), significant 
changes in the determinants of foreign aid between the two time periods would generally 
support the hypothesis that the War on Terror has influenced U.S. foreign aid allocation. 
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To test these determinants, this study will employ a partial fixed effects3 multivariate 
cross-sectional time-series regression model using panel corrected standard errors which 
will test for the significance of specific determinant variables in determining U.S. foreign 
aid allocation levels for the SSA states.4  
To test the main hypothesis that the War on Terror on U.S. has influenced U.S. 
foreign aid allocation, this study will test several sub-hypotheses on foreign aid allocation 
based on perspectives which explain U.S. foreign aid to this region. These perspectives 
emphasize the strategic economic interest of the U.S. and the development interest of the 
recipient SSA states as the leading explanations of foreign aid allocation. Testing 
hypotheses based around these perspectives and comparing their results between the time 
periods before and after the start of the War on Terror, this study will attempt to find any 
adverse changes in the purpose behind U.S. aid. To further test the potential effect of the 
War on Terror, several additional hypotheses based around specific interests for the U.S. 
in the War on Terror will be included to see if they have any effect on U.S. aid allocation. 
Only a select few of these hypotheses will be tested to keep a parsimonious model, with 
                                                 
3
 The partial fixed effects method employed in this study consists of finding specific cases in the 
data that may have a strong influence on the analysis and include these cases as dummy variables in the 
model to control for their effect. Influential cases are identified by comparing the summed residuals of the 
cases to five times the mean value of the dependent variable, with any cases with a higher value than this 
threshold being included as dummy variables in the model.   
4
 The SAA states include: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape 
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire), Republic of 
Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea- Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  
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additional hypotheses being tested in separate models. The primary model for this study 
will test the following hypotheses: 
1) The U.S. provides more foreign aid to SSA states that have stronger 
trade relationships with the U.S. 
 
2) The U.S. provides more foreign aid to SSA states with greater 
economic needs. 
 
3) The U.S. provides more foreign aid to SSA states with higher levels of 
freedom. 
 
4) The U.S. provides more foreign aid to SSA states that are at risk of 
failing. 
 
The first hypothesis bases U.S. foreign aid levels off of the strategic economic 
interests of the U.S. More specifically, aid levels are based on the goal of increasing trade 
with the region. Finding support for this hypothesis in the two time periods would show 
the lack of effect of the War on Terror in influencing the U.S.’s aid allocation towards 
helping develop the region and, instead, having the U.S. follow its traditional purposes of 
foreign aid. 
 The second hypothesis is that the U.S.’s foreign aid allocation is based on the 
economic and development needs of the recipients. Finding that the U.S. is providing 
foreign aid to the region on the basis of need would show not only the U.S. has not 
continued to follow traditional practices of foreign aid allocation which occurred during 
the Cold War, but any difference between the two time frames would suggest the War on 
Terror had an impact on the U.S.’s view towards the region. 
 According to the third hypothesis, the level of democracy and human rights 
performance of a recipient state are major influences on U.S. foreign aid. According to 
the beliefs of U.S. policymakers, democracy and freedom are necessary components of 
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development (USAID, 2002). The War on Terror may have negative effects on the 
preference for democracy though, as the focus on failing states and states that are 
engaged against terrorist movements may require the U.S. to provide aid to more 
repressive regimes. A change of focus on democracy and human rights protection before 
and after the War on Terror will show the effect of the War on Terror, as well as the 
U.S.’s true priorities in this new security environment. 
 The final hypothesis is specific to the War on Terror. According to this 
hypothesis, preventing the threat of terrorism in SSA is an important determinant of U.S. 
foreign aid allocation. Testing whether the risk of a recipient state failing has any effect 
on U.S. foreign aid allocation will help illuminate the effect of the War on Terror on aid 
allocation. Scholars have pointed to how U.S. policy has reflected little regard for the 
stability of SSA states (Kraxberger, 2005). Finding that U.S. foreign aid allocation is 
affected by the potential for states to fail since the start of the War on Terror would 
suggest that preventing terrorism has become a goal pursued through foreign aid.  
The results from this study show interesting findings regarding how the U.S. has 
applied its foreign aid to SSA. A lack of focus from the U.S. regarding its strategic 
economic interests towards SSA can be seen before and after the War on Terror. The U.S. 
appears not focus on democracy and the protection of human rights in the region with its 
foreign aid as well. The results do show a significant change in focus of U.S. aid after the 
start on the War on Terror, with a stronger focus on poorer states and states which have 
been susceptible to instability and failure. These results would indicate that the War on 
Terror has had some kind of an effect on U.S. aid allocation to SSA.  
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The focus of this study will add to the literature on foreign aid, as the effect of the 
War on Terror on foreign aid has only begun to be addressed by scholars (see Moss, 
Roodman, and Standley, 2006; Fleck and Kilby, 2008). Looking at SSA only and using 
the U.S.’s main concern towards the region, i.e. state failure, this study will be able to test 
whether the U.S. is actually following its own national security policy. Going forward, 
this study shall first provide a review of the literature on the theoretical purposes of 
foreign aid as well as a brief history of U.S. foreign aid practices towards the SSA. 
Following this initial review, the study will then develop the model of analysis and 
explain the conceptualization and the operationalization of the hypotheses which will be 
tested. Following the analysis of the data, this study will explain the results and shed light 
on any irregularities in the data. The conclusion of this study will review the results on 
the analysis and discuss the implications which the War on Terror has on U.S. foreign aid 
and U.S. foreign policy towards SSA.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON UNITED STATES FOREIGN AID TO SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA 
In order to test whether the War on Terror has had a profound effect on U.S. 
foreign aid allocation to SSA, it is important for this study to review the different 
theoretical perspectives on foreign aid found in the literature explain the purpose of aid 
allocation. By examining the different rationales behind the allocation of foreign aid, as 
well as the relationship which the U.S. shares with SSA in regards to aid, this study will 
present the theoretical foundations from which the study’s hypotheses can be derived. As 
it is impossible for this study to unearth and explain the purposes of the U.S.’s foreign aid 
allocation in their entirety, this review of the literature will examine what appear to be 
considered the most important purposes of giving aid.  
 The main body of scholarly literature on foreign aid can be divided into three 
groups: allocation studies, aid effectiveness studies, and foreign aid organizational 
studies. The allocation studies on aid, which is the basis for this study, are some of the 
more traditional studies on foreign aid. This type of study offers important insight into 
what type of concerns and interest aid donors have in deciding to whom to provide aid to 
and how much aid to give. There are different forms of allocation studies, including 
exploratory studies that test allocation trends against theoretical allocation interests 
(Dollar and Alesina, 2000; Feeny and McGillivray, 2002; Tuman and Ayoub, 2004); 
studies that test whether donors are paying attention to specific concerns, such as human 
rights (Alesina and Weder, 2002; Neumayer, 2003; Lebovic and Voeten, 2009) or 
rewarding recipients for support of a donor’s foreign policy (Dudley and Montmarquett, 
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1976; Kuziemko and Werker, 2006); and studies which test allocation levels against 
estimated levels based off of recipients’ development needs (Trumbull and Wall, 1994). 
These types of studies help hold donors accountable, as they can test whether donors’ 
allocation practices match their stated policies on foreign aid.  
Effectiveness studies of foreign aid tend to overlook the possible purposes of why 
donors provide aid and assume that the foreign aid has been allocated primarily for the 
development purposes of the recipient states. 5 Studies of this kind have included looking 
into how foreign aid has affected democracy (Knack, 2001; 2004), corruption (Tavares, 
2003), and economic growth (Burnside and Dollar, 2000) in recipient states. These types 
of studies not only show if foreign aid is actually working in creating development, but 
also help hold recipients accountable by testing whether foreign aid has any adverse 
effects on the recipients. 
A similar focus is found in the final type of study on foreign aid, which looks at 
the organization of foreign aid and donor aid agencies with the objective of making 
foreign aid more effective in promoting sustainable development. Studies of this type 
focus on the lack of positive results from foreign aid and promote positive reform by 
providing quantitative models of hypothetical allocation designs and qualitative evidence 
of the positive and negative aspects of foreign aid allocation and organization (Tendler, 
1975; Lancaster and Van Dusen, 2005; Brainard, 2006; Lancaster, 2008). 
                                                 
5
 The differences in the focus and perspectives between the allocation and effectiveness studies 
can be seen with who is undertaking them. Allocation studies, which look at the purpose of foreign aid in 
the context of international relations, tend to be traditionally undertaken by political scientists. 
Effectiveness studies, which overlook the foreign aid’s role in international relations, have been dominated 
mostly by economists (Brainard, 2006: 5; Lancaster, 1999: 6).  
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These different types of studies each offer insight into what the primary purpose 
for foreign aid is. By revealing the hidden interests of donors through their allocation 
tendencies, as well as the politics behind foreign aid, the literature shows a complex 
debate on foreign aid’s role in international relations. In an attempt to significantly add to 
this debate, this study will try to answer how the U.S. has used its aid in the War on 
Terror by testing different determinants of aid that focus on the threat of global terrorist 
groups and failing states. Turning now to the theoretical perspectives on foreign aid, this 
study will try to build the foundations for the hypotheses which will be tested.  
 
Theoretical Perspectives on Foreign Aid 
Theories on foreign aid allocation have been distinguished in previous studies by 
the issue of who foreign aid is supposed to serve, either the donor of the aid or the 
recipient states. Questioning whether donors give out aid based on egotistical or altruistic 
purposes has filled the literature on foreign aid (Griffin and Enos, 1970; Abbott, 1973; 
Dollar and Alesina, 2000; Feeny and McGillivray, 2002; Simon and McGillivray, 2002). 
These studies have pointed to two theoretical perspectives that explain the allocation of 
aid through the basic premise of who the aid is suppose to serve, the donor or the 
recipients.  
The first theoretical perspective, the “donor strategic interest” perspective, 
follows the theoretical framework of the neorealist view of international relations. 
According to this perspective, donors only allocate foreign aid to benefit their own 
national interests. These interests can include deterring national security threats, creating 
beneficial economic relations between the donor and recipient, and achieving positive 
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political gains from the recipient (Black, 1968). Following this perspective, hypotheses 
are shaped around the interests the U.S. can gain from SSA.  
The second perspective, the “development interest of the recipients” perspective, 
follows the idealist view of international relations. According to this perspective, foreign 
aid is allocated mainly to serve the interests of the recipients. Following this line of 
thinking, donors’ allocation patterns would be influenced by the humanitarian concerns 
the donors have towards the developing states (Lumsdaine, 1993). Deriving hypotheses 
from this perspective, this study will be able to test whether the recipients’ development 
needs influence U.S. foreign aid allocation. As the donor community has also pushed for 
more accountability and evidence of positive results in regards to development from 
foreign aid allocations (Monterrey Consensus, 2002; Dollar and Alesina, 2000), testing 
whether recipients with desirable types of governments and economic policies that 
promote the efficient use of foreign aid receive more aid than states who do not hold 
these qualities will shed more light on the significance of this perspective in explaining 
the priorities of the U.S. foreign aid.   
An additional potential factor on recent foreign aid allocation that needs to be 
considered is how foreign aid has been impacted by the War on Terror. The potential 
effect from the War on Terror may have a strong influence on the strength of these 
perspectives explaining U.S. aid allocation. Several recent studies have begun to look at 
how the current focus on international terrorism has affected foreign aid allocation and 
the U.S.’s relationship with SSA (Moss, Roodman, and Standley, 2005; Fleck and Kilby, 
2008; Azam and Thelen, 2009; Van de Walle, 2009). This potential factor on foreign aid 
follows the neorealist view, similar to the strategic interest perspective, where the U.S. 
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would allocate foreign aid in its strategic interest of preventing the expansion of terrorism 
in the region.  
Using foreign aid to prevent the expansion of terrorism in SSA may also be 
considered to be in line with the development interest perspective as well, as the U.S. 
may attempt to prevent the expansion of terrorism by aiding in the economic 
development of the region and preventing unstable states from failing. If the War on 
Terror has affected the foreign aid decisions of the U.S., one would expect factors related 
to the threat of terrorism, such as the level of instability in a state, previous terrorist 
attacks within a state, and any cooperation from a recipient with the U.S.’s 
counterterrorism operations in the region, attracting more aid to a recipient. Hypotheses 
can be derived from these potential factors which may indicate a direct effect of the War 
on Terror on U.S. aid. Hypotheses related to non-direct links to terrorism, such as the size 
of Muslim populations in recipient states, can also be included under this study to find 
any overarching policy against Islamic terrorism has been enacted by the U.S. 
It is important to review the two perspectives on foreign aid allocation in greater 
detail and provide some conceptualization of the different factors of U.S. foreign aid. The 
sections below will discuss the strategic interest perspective and the development interest 
perspective through their theoretical assumptions as well as their relation to the 
observations of U.S. foreign aid allocation and the U.S.’s relationship with SSA. A 
discussion of the conceptualization of the different aspects of the War on Terror will also 
follow.  
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The Strategic Interest Perspective on Foreign Aid 
The strategic interest perspective on foreign aid identifies aid as a tool of 
statecraft for a donor to use to achieve its foreign policy objectives. This perspective has 
been adopted by scholars of foreign aid (Black, 1968; Griffin and Enos, 1970; Lancaster, 
1999) and is generally the most accepted purpose of aid found in the literature (McKinlay 
and Little, 1977; Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor, 1998; Alesina and Weder, 2002; Lebovic 
and Voeten, 2009). One of the assumptions of the neorealist theory in which this 
perspective is based off of maintains “that states are rational actors characterized by a 
decision-making process leading to choices based on maximizing the national interest” 
(Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1997: 58). According to this assumption, donors would use 
foreign aid in a strategic manner that would benefit their own national interest by 
providing aid to specific recipient states. The basis of aid allocation under this 
perspective places an emphasis on how aid can benefit the donor foremost, rejecting the 
claim that donors would allocate aid simply out of any humanitarian concern towards 
recipient states (Griffin and Enos, 1970).  
Following the rationales that have been given for the allocation of aid, consisting 
of defense, economic, political, and humanitarian concerns (Black, 1968: 15-20), aid 
allocation under this perspective may be considered a function of reciprocity. This is seen 
with the view of foreign aid serving as a payment to recipient states for providing some 
type of economic, security, or political return to the donor state. Even the giving of aid 
based on humanitarian concerns may be interpreted as giving the donor some type of 
gratitude from recipient states, thereby increasing the donor’s “soft power” (Dudley and 
Montmarquette, 1976; Arvin and Barillas, 2002).  
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In regards to U.S. foreign aid under this perspective, U.S. aid has been noted to 
have “developed from a temporary post-war measure for the relief and reconstruction of 
war-torn economies into an extremely sophisticated and permanent instrument of 
American foreign policy” (Abbott, 1973: 2). On record, the purpose of U.S. foreign aid is 
explained in the “U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961” with: “AN ACT to promote the 
foreign policy, security, and general welfare of the United States by assisting peoples of 
the world in their efforts towards economic development and internal and external 
security, and for other purposes” (2003: 18). According to the Act, U.S. foreign aid is 
mainly intended to serve the interests of the U.S. by aiding recipients with their own 
internal development. This policy appears to have foreign aid benefit the U.S.’s national 
interest indirectly by aiding the interests of the recipients; a relationship which does not 
fit into the strategic interest perspective. The realities of its aid allocation point to other 
intentions than just development though. A stark example of this is U.S. foreign aid that 
is allocated the Middle East, where concerns over development and democracy are 
overlooked for more strategic interests that benefit the U.S. directly (Cronin and Ghani, 
2006: 203).  
In order for the strategic interest perspective to be applicable to U.S. foreign aid to 
SSA, the SSA states would need to contain some form of valuable return the U.S. may 
gain from its aid. What exactly is in the U.S.’s strategic interest that can be gained from 
SSA is not altogether clear. It has been noted by some scholars that one of the oldest and 
most enduring purposes of the U.S. foreign aid has been to counter security threats 
(Cronin and Ghani, 2006). This potential purpose of aid has been used to explain the 
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U.S.’s aid allocation to SSA during the Cold War, where the U.S. attempted to contain 
the expansion of communism by providing aid to client states (Moyo, 2009: 23).  
The expansion of communism is no longer considered to be a major threat to the 
U.S.’s national security though, and aid to SSA has outlived the Cold War (Schraeder, 
Hook, and Taylor, 1998: 294). SSA has been noted to contain many threats, including 
humanitarian crises from war, famine, and disease, which may have a potentially 
detrimental impact on the U.S. (Lancaster and Van Dusen, 2005; Brainard, 2006). Even 
though it has been argued that the U.S. has traditionally neglected these threats 
(Kraxberger, 2005), an attempt by the U.S. to alleviate these potential threats through 
allocating its foreign aid would only succeed by promoting the development of the 
region. Again, this would mean that the U.S. would only benefit indirectly, which does 
not fit into the strategic interest perspective.  
There may be other strategic interests which the U.S. may wish to seek by 
allocating aid towards SSA. These could include buying favor within a recipient state to 
establish military bases, gaining political cooperation with the U.S.’s foreign policy, and 
establishing economic trade relations with the region which may benefit the U.S. 
(Lancaster, 1999: 75-6).6 Having access to a state for the purpose of having U.S. military 
bases is important to the U.S.’s ability to remain as the world’s mightiest military power. 
Allocation studies have even found this interest to be a significant determinant in the 
U.S.’s aid allocation (Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor, 1998). With SSA’s proximity to the 
Middle East, this interest is even greater in the War on Terror (Schraeder, 2006). The 
                                                 
6
 Aid may also serve less strategic interests as well, such as giving more power to the U.S.‘s 
ambassadors within a recipient country or as a symbolic policy to be announced during visits from high 
profile by leaders (Lancaster, 1999). 
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creation of AFRICOM to serve as the U.S.’s newest regional military command is 
testament to this belief. This type of determinant is unfortunately limited in this study, as 
the U.S. has been unable to establish a base due to SSA states’ apprehensiveness towards 
AFRICOM’s actual purpose and effect on the region (Bah and Aning, 2007).7  
Economic interests are another strategic interest which the U.S. may wish to 
pursue through its aid allocation. Some studies have looked at the effect that economic 
interests have had on U.S. aid allocations (McKinlay and Little, 1977). Increased trade to 
the region was a major policy issue for the U.S. towards SSA after the end of the Cold 
War. The U.S. has implemented a trade relationship with the region through the African 
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), signed into law in May of 2000. The act states the 
U.S.’s interest, as “sub-Saharan Africa represents a region of enormous economic 
potential and of enduring political significance to the United States” (Trade and 
Development Act, 2000: 3). Under AGOA, the U.S. has developed trade policies that 
allow for a beneficial trade relationship to exist between the U.S. and SSA. Trade from 
AGOA has seen a high level of disproportionality between U.S. exports and imports to 
the region, with the U.S. importing roughly five times the value of goods compared to the 
amount it has exported to the region (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2009; see Figure 1). 
While this trend appears to benefit SSA more than the U.S., it is important to see what 
exactly the U.S. has been importing from the region.  
                                                 
7
 The U.S. has been given access to Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti for its Combined Joint Task 
Force Horn Africa (CJTF-HOA) operations.  
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According to the AGOA statistics, over 90% of the imports brought in from 
AGOA program were from petroleum products (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2009: 
2). Providing aid to the region to develop the oil producing capacity appears to be a major 
interest which the U.S could pursue through aid. Obtaining oil from SSA has gained a lot 
of attention in the U.S., where oil from SSA has been viewed as a suitable substitute to an 
uneasy supply from the Middle East (Volman, 2003).  
 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There may be a problem with the U.S. using aid to increase their access to trade 
with SSA, however. The AGOA act has the stated goal of reforming SSA economies to 
market-oriented systems that would promote growth and reduce the dependency on 
$U.S. Billons Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, 2009 
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foreign aid (AGOA, 2009). As giving foreign aid lost a lot of support in Congress after 
the end of the Cold War, increased trade to the SSA was intended to be a substitute for 
aid. If the U.S. is following these intentions through AGOA, then aid should have 
decreased to states that have established trade relations with the U.S. While hypotheses 
can be tested on the effect of the U.S.’s trade with SSA and SSA oil exporting to the 
U.S., the analysis will need to take into account this potential discrepancy in the analysis.  
The Development Interest Perspective on Foreign Aid 
The development interest theoretical perspective on foreign aid follows the belief 
that foreign aid is allocated with the purpose to serve the interests of the recipients in 
regards to their needs for sustainable development. The criteria of foreign aid from the 
OECD states that foreign aid (ODA) is for developmental purposes that serve the 
development of the recipient state only (OECD, 2008). These restrictions place heavy 
emphasis on humanitarian concern and the recipients’ needs as the major influence 
behind aid allocation. This view towards the purpose of foreign aid can be compared to a 
state’s use of social and economic welfare programs as safety nets for their poorest 
members of the society (Noel and Therien, 1995). Following this perspective on the 
purpose of aid, one would expect to see higher levels of aid going to those who need help 
the most rather than to states which have relatively better off populations.  
Though scholars have traditionally rejected the humanitarian concerns of donors 
influencing aid allocation (McKinlay and Little, 1977; Feeny and McGillivray, 2002: 11), 
allocation studies have found some evidence that humanitarianism does have some effect 
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on foreign aid.8 Some idealist scholars have pointed to qualitative evidence that suggests 
that the strategic national interest of donors cannot explain aid allocation alone and that 
humanitarian intentions still remain a viable influence on foreign aid allocation. 
Lumsdaine points to the lack of support for increasing foreign aid from “Cold Warriors,” 
or national security centered congressional members and policymakers, and the desire to 
increase aid within more liberal minded politicians as evidence that aid is not primarily 
allocated in the interests of the donor (1993: 31). Supporters of this perspective have 
pointed to the use of moral reasoning, as well as national interests, from political leaders 
when discussing the allocation of aid (Riddell, 1987: 62). This can be seen with President 
George W. Bush in his arguments for aid to Africa: 
America’s approach to Africa stems from both our ideals and our interests [italics 
added]. We believe that every human life is precious. We believe that our brothers 
and sisters in Africa have dignity and value because they bear the mark of our 
Creator. We believe our spirit is renewed when we help African children and 
families live and thrive. Africa is also increasingly vital to our strategic interests. 
We have seen that conditions on the other side of the world can have a direct 
impact on our own security. We know that if Africa were to continue on the old 
path of decline, it would be more likely to produce failed states, foster ideologies 
of radicalism, and spread violence across borders. (Woolley and Peters, 2010) 
 
                                                 
8
 Different aspects of allocation studies have lead to finding evidence of humanitarianism in aid 
allocation. These include the time period which aid allocation is studied, with studies focusing on aid 
allocation after the Cold War finding more evidence of donors focusing less on their own strategic interests 
(McGillivray, 2005), and the focus on specific donors, such as studies looking at Japanese foreign aid 
allocation that have found evidence of humanitarianism (Tuman and Ayoub, 2004). Studies focusing on the 
U.S. foreign aid have found little evidence of the U.S. explicitly focusing on the development of the 
recipients (Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor, 1998; Alesina and Weder, 2002). Note, Schraeder’s study find 
evidence that the U.S. provide more aid on average to worse off economic states, but explain this result as 
an unintentional consequence of the U.S.’s ignorance in providing more aid to strategic states, such as 
Zaire, that were highly unstable and are plagued by low economic growth (1998: 310-311). 
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This type of argument on the duality over the purpose of aid shows the false 
dichotomy the debate on foreign aid presents with aid as either being allocated for only 
the donor’s interests or the recipients’ needs (Riddell, 1987). Other evidence shows this 
belief as well, as the U.S.’s stated policy directives in regards to aid represent two 
separate purposes from its foreign assistance institutions. The U.S. State Department 
(DOS) and its foreign assistance organization, USAID, both post mission statements that 
represent almost contradictory purposes of its foreign aid. The DOS mission for foreign 
aid reads: “To create a more secure, democratic, and prosperous world for the benefit of 
the American people and the international community;” compared with USAID’s 
mission: “to provide economic, development, and humanitarian assistance around the 
world in support of the foreign policy goals of the U.S.” (Lancaster and van Dusen, 2005: 
7-8). The DOS mission for aid represents an idealist view where aid benefits not only the 
U.S., but the also the “international community.” USAID, on the other hand, explains aid 
in terms of pure national interest. These two beliefs from organizations heavily involved 
in aid allocation clearly show the confusion over the true purpose of foreign aid within 
U.S. foreign policy, allowing for the belief that foreign aid can be allocated around 
altruistic beliefs and not solely for the national interest of the donor.9  
It is easier to accept that U.S. foreign aid to SSA has some altruistic purposes than 
to accept that aid to other regions of the world, such as the Middle East, which contain 
                                                 
9
 The difference within these mission statements of who foreign aid is suppose is intended to serve 
is interesting, as the idealist and realist/neorealist views held by the DOS and USAID appear to contrary to 
their core purposes. The DOS statement is clearly idealist, though the concern of the DOS is achieving U.S. 
foreign policy and not with the betterment of the “international community.” USAID holds on to a more 
realist focus in their mission statement, but operate in a more idealist environment of aiding the least 
developed nations of the world.  
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considerable economic and security interests to the U.S. SSA’s low human development 
indicator (HDI) ratings on a whole compared to the rest of the world indicate the vital 
need for assistance (see Figures 3 and 4). With this profound need of assistance for 
development, donors, such as the U.S., may feel more incline to provide foreign aid 
towards this region based around altruistic concerns rather than their own self-interest.  
The figures below indicate SSA has been consistently below the average human 
development level for the entire world and can be seen as being the least developed of all 
of the developing regions. Western powers have traditionally felt some sort of 
responsibility towards ensuring the development of SSA, with some of this responsibility 
based around guilt felt over slavery and colonialism (Van de Walle, 2001: 191). This 
feeling of responsibility towards the region can be seen with on average twenty-five 
percent of foreign aid from OECD DAC members going to the region since 1960 
(OECD, 2010). SSA also represents a region that has played little strategic interest to the 
U.S. (Kraxberger, 2005), traditionally being viewed as in Europe’s sphere of influence. 
While the independence of the SSA states after the Second World War brought some 
attention to the region, SSA has continually been overlooked by the U.S. compared to its 
interest in other regions of the world. This low level of importance would theoretically 
mean that the aid provided by the U.S. to SSA would be based off more altruistic 
concerns than any egotistical interest the U.S. would have towards the region.  
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Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
U.S. foreign aid going to the SSA has been viewed as being driven by non-
humanitarian concerns, however, especially during the Cold War (Moyo, 2009). 
Continued foreign aid to corrupt and tyrannical leaders, such as Mobutu in Zaire and Doe 
Source: United Nations Development Programme, 2009 
Source: United Nations Development Programme, 2009 
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in Liberia, to shore up support against communist movements, represents some of the key 
examples of the problems with the development interest perspective. Though some 
scholars have argued that the Cold War had little effect on aid allocation to the region 
(Van de Walle, 2001: 196), studies have shown that the U.S. has not taken much concern 
in achieving effective development in regards to democracy and human rights (Alesina 
and Weder, 2002; Lebovic and Voeten, 2009).10  
If the U.S.’s foreign aid went through a “moral descent” during the Cold War 
(Eberstadt, 1988), then it is important to see how aid has changed since the Cold War 
ended. As foreign aid declined after the end of the Cold War, it is reasonable to believe 
that the little aid that went to SSA was for development purposes for the recipients. Since 
SSA held a low strategic interest towards the U.S.’s global interests after the Cold War 
(Kraxberger, 2005), there would appear to be little interests that the U.S. would seek from 
the allocation of its aid to the region. A sense of foreign aid’s failures in creating 
development also emerged at this time, with a string of reforms revolving around 
accountability of the recipients. According to the Monterrey Consensus on reforming 
foreign assistance, the international donors would now be committed to promoting 
“sound policies, good governance at all levels and the rule of law” (Monterrey 
Consensus, 2002: 5).  
Much of this new type of thinking towards foreign aid and international 
development has come after the publication of the well-cited Burnside and Dollar (2000) 
article, which found positive development results within recipients when foreign aid was 
                                                 
10
 Neumayer finds evidence of civil and political rights having some influence on bilateral aid 
allocation, but the focus on human rights is not consistent enough to be a significant consideration for 
foreign aid donors (2003).  
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allocated into a “good policy environment.” This good policy environment includes 
sound fiscal, monetary, and trade policies that caused foreign aid to be used in a 
responsible manner that did not allow the aid to be squandered through corruption. A 
push for more democracy in the region was included in these calls for reform, as it was 
viewed by western donors, especially the U.S., that democracy would be the answer to 
the development problems of SSA (Moyo, 2009).  
Allocation studies looking at the period at the end of the Cold War have found 
donors paying more attention to governance and other development criteria (Dollar and 
Alesina, 2000; Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004; McGillivray, 2005). Studies that focus on 
U.S. allocation specifically, though, have found the U.S. not paying attention to the 
quality of governments in regards to human and political rights (Lebovic and Voeten, 
2009). While the actual quality of governance has been overlooked by the U.S., some 
studies have found that the U.S. does favor democracies with its allocation (Alesina and 
Weder, 2002). Dollar and Alesina (2000) have found, controlling for aid to Israel and 
Egypt, that the U.S.’s aid is targeted towards poverty, democracy, and openness. This 
type of finding supports the perspective that the U.S. would allocate its aid to support the 
SSA states’ interests. Deriving hypotheses based around the donors’ preference towards 
sound economic policies and level of democracy and political rights, along with 
hypotheses that test the level of need within recipients, this study will be able to test 
whether the U.S. has any altruistic concerns towards the region. 
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Potential Effect of the War on Terror on Foreign Aid 
 As this study’s focus is on the effect of the War on Terror, it is important to 
review the different aspects of the War on Terror to understand how this new security 
environment may have affected U.S. foreign aid. Following the strategic interest 
perspective on foreign aid, one may view the potential effects of the War on Terror 
influencing U.S. aid to be allocated in a manner that promotes the U.S. national security 
interest of preventing terrorist groups from expanding in the region. This potential use of 
foreign aid is similar to the foreign aid allocated during the Cold War, where the U.S. 
provided aid as a tool of containment against communism (Korb, 2008). The War on 
Terror may have caused the U.S. focus on the development of the recipient states more as 
well, as the development of the recipients through the use of foreign aid may be required 
for the U.S. to prevent the threat of global terrorist movements from strengthening 
(Lancaster and Van Dusen, 2005; Korb, 2008). 
Scholars have looked at how certain political environments have affected foreign 
aid in the past (McKinlay and Little, 1977; Clough, 1992; Brainard, 2006; Fleck and 
Kilby, 2008; Azam and Thelen, 2009). As scholars like these have looked at how foreign 
aid has been affected either by the Cold War, the post-Cold War, or the War on Terror, 
one can argue that the security environment which foreign aid is allocated in has an effect 
on how aid is allocated and deserves deeper analysis into its actual effect on aid 
allocation practices.  
Figure 4 shows the total U.S. foreign aid allocation from 1960-2008. Reviewing 
the U.S.’s foreign aid trend since the 1960’s, one can see the fluctuations in aid allocation 
with each change in security environment with the Cold War, post-Cold War, and the 
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War on Terror. While aid dropped during the latter stages of the Cold War, U.S. foreign 
aid reaches its lowest point during the post-Cold War period. This is a time the U.S. faced 
little threat from rival powers, limiting the use of foreign aid as a strategic tool of U.S. 
foreign policy. The War on Terror, starting in 2001, shows the beginning rise of U.S. aid 
to its highest point, clearly representing an effect the latest security environment has had 
on U.S. aid allocation.  
 
 
Figure 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The international security environments have also have had an impact on the 
U.S.’s relationship towards SSA as well. During the Cold War, U.S. interest with SSA 
was viewed to be limited towards the U.S.’s desire to contain communism (Schraeder, 
Hook, and Taylor, 1998; Korb, 2008: 27). This security interest of the U.S. has also been 
Source: OECD Stat Extracts, 2009 
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found to influence other donors’ aid allocation to the region.11 This focus on communism 
has had an effect on the threat which the U.S. faces today, as the U.S. ignored the realities 
of the region’s economic and political circumstances. This neglect allowed for aid to be 
wasted on corrupt dictators, leading to complete state failures throughout the region (Van 
de Walle, 2001; Kraxberger, 2005).  
The post-Cold War period saw a significant change in the U.S.’s relationship with 
SSA. For starters, the decline of aid and a beginning focus on aid effectiveness saw the 
U.S. dropping old policies of supporting corrupt regimes in the region (Radelet, 2003). 
While the focus on the use of foreign aid changed, the U.S.’s neglect of the region still 
remained due to the lack of strategic importance in which the region had towards the U.S. 
This neglect culminated with the U.S. withholding any type of military assistance to 
prevent some of the worst crises the region and the world have ever seen. The lack of 
effort to stop the genocide in Rwanda is the greatest example of this neglect (Copson, 
2007:4).12  
 The War on Terror has greatly affected the U.S.’s relationship with SSA. Some 
scholars have seen similarities in the U.S.’s relationship with SSA during the War on 
Terror with their relationship during the Cold War (Schraeder, 2006: 198-199), as SSA 
has been viewed to be potentially used by the U.S. as a battleground for proxy wars and 
                                                 
11
 Tuman and Ayoub (2004) find Japanese ODA to 35 SSA states to be partly influenced by U.S. 
security interests, indicating pressure from the U.S. on other donors to follow U.S. security concerns.  
12
 The U.S.’s failure to establish peace and security in Somalia during the early 1990’s, 
culminating with the death of 18 U.S. soldiers and over 1,000 Somali deaths during an operation on 3-4 
October, 1993, has been argued as the leading cause of the U.S.’s reluctance to send peacekeeping forces to 
SSA. Besides Rwanda, the U.S.’s reluctance to send in peacekeepers can be seen with Liberia in 2003 and 
into Darfur from 2003-2009.    
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where foreign aid to the region is allocated based off of the U.S.’s interests only. The 
War on Terror, though, requires the U.S. to pay attention to the political and economic 
conditions, to prevent states from failing (USAID, 2002).  
After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, U.S. foreign policy has been 
clearly shaped by the threat of international terrorism (Dollar, 2008). With the 9/11 
attacks, policymakers saw failed states as being a greater threat to the U.S. than the 
traditional conquering powers from previous decades (U.S. National Security Strategy, 
2002). What can be considered a failed state and how do these types of states threaten 
U.S. national security? Different views on state failure offer various criteria of what 
constitutes a failed state. Failed states can be described in basic terms as being “unable to 
control their borders, their economy has deteriorated, they are involved in bitter violent 
struggles, there is no evidence of functioning infrastructure, and their political institutions 
lack any form of legitimacy” (Howard, 2010: 10). Various criteria of what constitutes a 
failed state exist in the literature. According to Rotberg, failed states are states whose 
governments have loss legitimacy within their publics, where they are overtaken by 
internal violence and cannot provide the political goods, such as education and security, 
to their citizens (2003). Other views on what constitutes a failed state look at the 
existence of a political disturbance within a state as evidence of failure. According to the 
Political Instability Task Force (PITF), failed states are states that have experienced an 
adverse regime change, an ethnic or revolutionary war, or a genocide or policide (PITF, 
2010). 
While the cause of failure for states in not universal, the characteristics of a failed 
state appear to exist in some form throughout all failed states. These characteristics 
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include violence, corruption, and humanitarian suffering. While the existence of these 
characteristics does not cause failure and strong stable states may suffer from some these 
characteristics momentarily, failed states exhibit these characteristics in a profound and 
destructive manner. Violence in failed states can consist of insurgent movements against 
the ruling regime, violence across ethnic lines over the control of resources, and violence 
from the government used to control and repress its citizens (Rotberg, 2003: 5). 
Corruption is another visible characteristic of failed states, as it replaces the legitimate 
functions of the government with predatory practices which regimes to hold on to power 
(Bates, 2008).13 Humanitarian suffering within failed states is also prevalent, caused from 
violence or the breakdown of infrastructure and institutions, where disease and hunger 
overtake parts of the society.  
The threat of failed states towards the U.S. comes from this political 
phenomenon’s causal link “to increased and widespread humanitarian suffering, regional 
instability, and transnational threats of international organized crime and terrorism” 
(Milliken, 2003: 12). The ability of terrorist groups to take advantage of the chaos within 
failed states can be seen as a major threat for the U.S. Failed states allow for terrorist 
groups to establish bases, freely cross between borders, prepare for attacks by carrying 
out elicit operations through organized crime such as drug smuggling to raise funds, and 
recruit followers from the desperate populations which surround them.  
SSA clearly contains states which are at risk of failing or have already failed. 
States such as Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, and Sierra Leone 
have been described as either failed or even collapsed, as with the case of Somalia where 
                                                 
13
 Bates indicates corruption as leading cause of failure as well. 
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any evidence of the state has completely disappeared (Rotberg, 2003). A number of other 
states have experienced some form of political disturbance, which the PITF indicates as 
evidence of total or partial state failure. Table 2 lists the number of political disturbances 
in SSA from 1991-2007 listed in the PITF datasets. Evidence of terrorist groups such as 
al Qaeda operating in these failed states, with these groups establishing bases, setting up 
regional terrorist operations, and profiting from illicit trade operations, exemplifies the 
threat of terrorism the U.S. would wish to contain.  
 
 
Table 2 
 
 
The U.S. recognition of the region as a being a central location to the threat of 
terrorism is a sign of the effect of the War on Terror on the U.S.’s policy towards the 
SSA. With terrorist groups tied to al Qaeda operating out of the Sahel region and the 
Horn of Africa, some analysts view the probability of international terrorism emerging in 
the region as only a matter of time (Cilliers, 2003). Though some view the threat from 
terrorism in SSA as being misleading (Piombo, 2007; Berschinski, 2007; Bah and Aning, 
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2008),14 the U.S. has launched several counterterrorism policies and programs within the 
region that provide counterterrorism training and support to SSA states. Some of these 
programs include the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) and its successor, the Trans-Sahara 
Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), which has the mission of “enhancing the 
indigenous capacity of governments in the Pan-Sahel (Mauritania, Mali, Chad, Niger, 
Nigeria, and Senegal) to confront the challenge posed by terrorist organizations in the 
region” by focusing on counterterrorism, democratic governance, and military assistance 
from the U.S. (AFRICOM, 2009). Another regional security program is the Operation 
Enduring Freedom Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), which includes ten African states (Algeria, 
Burkina Faso, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania, Mali, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal). 
OEF-TS supports the TSCTP program by focusing on overall security and cooperation 
rather than solely on counterterrorism ( AFRICOM, 2009).  
 The U.S.’s own military action in the region is another sign of how important the 
threat of terrorism in the SSA is to the U.S. The establishment of AFRICOM, which is 
self-described as a “new type of command” that understands the relationships between 
security, development, diplomacy and prosperity in creating security in Africa or the 
region(AFRICOM, 2009), is testament to how serious the U.S.’s focus on SSA is.15 The 
                                                 
14
 This belief that the threat of terrorism in SSA is overstated is based around the fact that most 
terrorist groups in the region are focused on regional targets and are not globally orientated. Also, the belief 
that failed states would benefit terrorist groups has been argued to be exaggerated, as terrorist groups would 
have just as hard of a time establishing itself in the chaos of a failed state as legitimate governments would. 
15
 Skepticism does exist towards the U.S.’s actual interest in AFRICOM (Bah and Aning, 2007).  
AFRICOM’s predecessors, most notably the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and its successor 
the Africa Contingency Training Assistance (ACOTA), ultimately lost policymakers’ interest as a reliable 
security policy. The U.S.’s unwillingness to send troops to stop African crises since the debacle of its 
operation in Somalia in 1993 may be a testament to the U.S.’s disregard towards achieving true security in 
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U.S. carrying out operations against terrorist targets in Somalia and supporting the 
removal of the Islamic Courts from power in Somalia by Ethiopian forces are more signs 
that the U.S. is taking a heavier interest in the security situation in SSA since the 
beginning of the War on Terror. 
To face the threat of failing states, the U.S. has developed a new interest in 
achieving sustainable development in SSA as well. Through this interest, the U.S. has 
established a new independent development institution, the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation (MCC), which will oversee new development funds that are allocated 
through the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). Relying on a competitive selection 
processes for recipients to participate in as well as more accountability on recipients 
through country-led solutions and implementation, the MCC is providing for a 
development aid strategy that prevents previous detrimental aid allocation practices from 
occurring. A stronger focus on one of SSA gravest problems, HIV/AIDS, through the 
U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) is also a sign that the U.S. 
is embracing one of the biggest threats to stability in the region (Neilson, 2005).  
 Testing the effect of the War on Terror will require this study to look at context of 
this security environment, specifically the threat from failing states and Islamic terrorism 
(Lyman and Morrison. 2004), and how the allocation of foreign aid to SSA can protect 
U.S. national security. Seeing whether the U.S. is providing aid to help prevent state 
failure as well as deterring terrorist threats from arising will require testing foreign aid 
                                                                                                                                                 
the region. While the U.S. has engaged SSA more directly through some of it counter-terrorism programs, 
it is still unknown how the U.S. will react to future crises in the region. 
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determinants that measure the risk of failure as well as the SSA states role in the War on 
Terror; either as cooperating partners or states at risk of terrorism.  
 The perspectives on foreign aid allocation each offer a different view into the 
most influential factor in determining a donor’s foreign aid allocation. By looking at 
whether the U.S. follows its own strategic interest, the development interest of the SSA 
states, and if the U.S. is being affected by the specific threat of terrorism in the region, 
this study will be able to offer some insight into how the U.S. views foreign aid as well as 
its relationship with SSA. The following chapter will explain how these three 
perspectives will be tested by breaking down the methodology and operationalization of 
the different hypotheses.  
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
The methodology for this study on the effect of the War on Terror on the U.S.’s 
foreign aid allocation on SSA will be a multivariate panel regression that will test several 
hypothesized determinants of U.S. foreign aid to SSA before and after the start of the 
War on Terror to see if any change in purpose of U.S. aid occurred after the start of this 
new security environment. According to the perspectives on foreign aid allocation 
described in the previous chapter, the U.S.’s strategic interest towards SSA and the U.S.’s 
concern towards the development of the recipient states stand as potential explanations 
for the U.S.’s aid allocation to the region. From these two perspectives, several 
hypotheses can be derived that explain the different aspects of U.S. foreign aid under 
each perspective. Also, this study will include additional hypotheses that are based off of 
specific interests connected to the War on Terror to see if this security environment has 
had any specific effect on U.S. foreign aid to the region.  
Before hypotheses derived from these perspectives can be tested, a discussion of 
the methodology is required. The methodology for this study on U.S. foreign aid 
allocation will consist of a multivariate panel regression that tests potential determinants 
of the actual amount of foreign aid allocated to the SSA states. The study assumes that 
specific cases in the data have a higher influential effect on U.S. foreign aid than the rest 
of the data. To control for these effects, this study will employ a partial fixed effects 
model that will include the most significant cases as dummy variables in each analysis. 
These cases will be selected by finding the summed residuals and residual variance ratios 
of all the cases and including any case whose summed residuals rated five times higher 
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than the mean value of the dependent variable in the analysis. Several allocation studies 
have relied on using panel data (Berthe´lemy and Tichit, 2004; Trumball and Wall, 1994; 
Collier and Dollar, 2002; Feyzioglu, Swaroop, and Zhu, 1998), and the method of using 
panel corrected standard errors with fixed effects have been noted for its superiority in 
time-series models over other methods (Beck and Katz, 1995; 1996).  
The panel analysis for this study consists of the SSA states16 over the time period 
of 1992-2008. While this study is testing for the effect of the War on Terror on U.S. 
foreign aid allocation, it is important to split the analysis between the start of the War on 
Terror (2001). The first period comprises the time period from 1992 to 2000 and the 
second comprises the time period from 2002 to 2008. The year 2001 will not be included 
in the analysis, as the start of the War on Terror occurred over half way through the year. 
Aid allocated during this year cannot be determined to be allocated before or after the 
attacks, limiting the ability of seeing a true effect from the War on Terror. Running 
separate analyses is important, as any significant change in determinant variables 
between the two time periods would show an important effect which the War on Terror 
may have on U.S. foreign aid.  
 
 
                                                 
16
 SAA states included in this study include: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire), Republic 
of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea- Bissau, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Due to lack of data for some of the states, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Liberia, Sao 
Tome & Principe, and Somalia are not included in the analysis. Guinea, Namibia, and Sierra Leone also 
suffer from serious missing data problems in the dataset.  
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Conceptionalization of Hypotheses and Operationalization of Variables 
Reviewing the two perspectives on purpose of foreign aid allocation and the 
additional interests connected to the War on Terror, each of these views and interests 
contain several aspects in which the U.S. may consider when allocating its foreign aid to 
SSA. From these different perspectives and potential interests, several hypotheses may be 
derived that each measure separate interests on which the U.S. may focus when deciding 
on its foreign aid allocation. While several hypotheses will be discussed in the following 
sections, only a selected number of hypotheses from each perspective will be included in 
the final analysis in an attempt to keep the model parsimonious. The following sections 
will now describe the potential hypotheses and the operationalization of their variables. 
Perspective 1: Strategic Interest of the U.S. 
 According to the strategic interest perspective, the U.S.’s foreign aid allocation is 
affected mainly by the interests the U.S. would have towards SSA. As these interests may 
comprise of political and economic interests, such as access to new trade markets, access 
to natural resources such as oil, cooperation with U.S. foreign policy from the recipient 
state, and other benefits which would be potential reciprocates from the allocation of aid, 
the hypotheses that are derived from this perspective each must express these interests in 
some fashion.  
Economic interest hypotheses have been used before, as trade relations between 
the U.S. and many SSA states have been established since the end of the Cold War. 
Hypotheses which look at the U.S.’s interest in oil from SSA have also been used, as 
growing interest within U.S. policymakers towards increasing its reliance of oil from the 
region has been noted in the literature (Sebunya, 2001; Volman, 2003; Ndumbe, 2004). 
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Other potential economic variables, such as the total amount of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) from the U.S. in SSA states, may potentially reveal the amount of interest the U.S. 
has in the region.17 Using a trade variable that measures the total amount of trading 
(importing and exporting) between the U.S. and the individual SSA states and an oil 
exporting variable that shows which states have exported oil to the U.S., this analysis will 
be able to test hypotheses pertaining to the economic interest the U.S. would have 
towards SSA.18 
Though economic hypotheses are relatively easy to conceptualize, strategic 
political interest variables are not so easy. Previous studies on U.S. aid allocation have 
relied on United Nation Security Council (UNSC) rotating membership votes (Kuziemko 
and Werker, 2006), access for military bases (Schraeder, 2006), and ideological 
similarities with the U.S. (Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor,1998) as interests on which the 
U.S. would focus. While studies have relied on these potential hypotheses and variables 
before, many of these variables do not fit into this study’s model due to the timeframe in 
which the study covers, post-Cold War, as well as the sole regional focus on SSA. It is 
difficult to address causality with votes in the UNSC, as it cannot be seen whether the 
SSA member states are voting because they are getting aid from the U.S. or they are truly 
voting in their own best interest (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006). The access to African 
military bases in recent years is difficult to use, as the U.S. has access to only one base in 
                                                 
17
 A U.S. FDI variable was tested in separate trials. The results produced similar results to the total 
U.S. trade variable, so it was decided to be not included in the analysis. 
18
 There are potential theoretical problems with these two variables. For the trade variable, the 
increase of trade between the U.S. and SSA was to act as a supplement and replacement for aid to the 
region. Also, oil exporting countries have been found to benefit from the increase in trade the most (Moyo, 
2009), potentially creating problems of autocorrelation between the variables.  
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SSA, Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, and has found extreme difficulty in establishing a base 
for AFRICOM (Bah and Aning, 2008). Measuring ideologies similar to the U.S. is also 
futile, as this variable does not resonate in a post-Cold War foreign policy environment. 
A strategic political interest that can be included involves the size and support of 
the recipient states military. Analysts of U.S. foreign aid allocation have identified 
security as being the biggest strategic interest of the U.S. when allocating its foreign aid 
(Cronin and Ghani, 2006: 195). The size of a recipient’s armed forces and its military 
expenditures as a percentage of its GNP is a security variable that has been used in 
allocation studies that focus on aid given out during the Cold War (Schraeder, Hook, and 
Taylor, 1998).19 Testing the size of military expenditures in a recipient state supports the 
interest for the U.S. of wanting strong military relationships with the recipient. According 
to the hypothesis, strong military states would receive larger amounts of aid in an attempt 
to maintain a strong military alliance between the U.S. and the recipients. Other studies 
have used a similar variable along a power-politics rational, where states with higher 
military expenditures are viewed as more stable politically (McKinlay and Little, 1977).20 
Hypotheses under this rational suggest the U.S. would wish to maintain stability in 
regions by supporting stronger states through foreign aid. Though these types of 
hypotheses have been used before in determining foreign aid allocation, its validity in this 
model is not very high so its presence in this study’s model cannot be fully justified. In an 
                                                 
19
 Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor do not find this variable to be significant for their analysis on U.S. 
foreign aid.  
20
 McKinlay and Little find power capabilities with security connotations, such as military 
strength, are critical determinants of the donor’s absoluter commitment, or support, to the recipient states. 
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attempt for a parsimonious model, a strategic political variable will not be included in the 
analysis. 
The strategic interest hypotheses that will to be tested in the analysis include: 
H1) The U.S. provides more foreign aid to SSA states that have stronger 
trade relationships with the U.S. 
 
H2) The U.S. provides more foreign aid to SSA states which export oil to 
the U.S. 
 
These two hypotheses provide the main economic interests in which the U.S. would have 
towards SSA. If these hypotheses were found to be correct, then one would expect the 
U.S. to base a significant part of its allocation off of how much a recipient state trades 
with the U.S. and whether a SSA state exports oil to the U.S. Operationalizing variables 
for these hypotheses will require measuring the amount of economic activity of a 
recipient state through trade and oil exporting. For the first hypothesis, H1, a Total U.S. 
Trade/GDP variable is created that measures the total economic value of trade between 
the U.S. and a recipient state, importing and exporting, in constant 2005 US dollars, 
represented as a ratio of the total trade compared to recipient’s GDP. This manner of 
operationalization will show how important trade with the U.S. is and control for 
differences in size of economies between the different SSA states. If this hypothesis is 
found to be correct, the results in the analysis should show a positive relationship 
between the allocated foreign aid and the trade variable.  
The second hypothesis, pertaining to the importance of oil exports the U.S., can 
be operationalized in two manners. The first manner of operationalization involves 
creating a dummy variable that codes a recipient state that exports oil to the U.S. with a 
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value of (1) and a non-exporting recipient as a zero, labeled as Oil Exporting dummy in 
the analysis. The second manner of operationalization involves measuring the amount of 
oil21 exported to the U.S. by recipient states in a year and creating a natural log of this 
amount.22 This variable, labeled as Log of Oil Exports to U.S., will show the difference in 
the amount of oil exported and its affect on U.S. foreign aid allocation. For this 
hypothesis to be correct, the results from the analysis should show a positive relationship 
between the oil variables and the amount of foreign aid allocated. 
These variables are reliable and have a high validity in measuring the level of 
economic interest the U.S. should have towards the region. The variables in these two 
hypotheses may have a problem due to their high level of correlation between trade with 
the U.S. and oil exports to the U.S. As these two hypotheses may present methodological 
problems when they are both included in the model, only one hypothesis, H1, will be 
included in the main model for analysis. The second hypothesis will be included in an 
alternative model in the Appendix.  
Perspective 2: Development Interest of the SSA states 
 According to the development interest perspective, the U.S.’s foreign aid 
allocation is based on the economic and humanitarian needs of the recipient states. This 
perspective also emphasizes the level of economic and political policy soundness within 
recipient states in order to insure that economic development really will be fostered 
through the allocation of foreign aid. This perspective takes on the idealist viewpoint that 
                                                 
21
 Measured in thousands of barrels. 
22
 A natural log of oil exports is used to limit the influence of extreme values of oil exports from 
the different oil exporting states. 
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foreign aid should be used to benefit the recipients directly through developing their 
societies. Following this perspective, several hypotheses can be conceptualized about 
whether the U.S. is influenced by the level of poverty, freedom, and economic openness 
within the recipient states. 
 Finding variables to test development needs and economic and political ratings is 
not difficult, as international financial institutions (IFI), such as the World Bank (WB) 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), collect different kinds of data and make 
them easily available. The World Development Indicators (WDI), which provides 
economic, political, humanitarian, and civil society data, is an excellent source for data 
collection for variables under this perspective. Poverty and humanitarian conditions can 
be measured as the real GDP per capita of a recipient state. Other variables that measure 
specific conditions, such as literacy and daily caloric intake, do exist, but are 
unfortunately plagued by missing annual data for SSA.23 Luckily, GDP per capita is 
typically highly correlated with these other measures and is available for most SSA states 
for the time periods covered. Its customary use in allocation studies speaks for its 
reliability and validity as a multipurpose variable (Berthe´lemy and Tichit, 2004; 
McKinlay and Little, 1977; Lebovic and Voeten, 2009; Tuman and Ayoub, 2004).  
  Measures of economic policy and governance are also important variables that the 
U.S. has focused on since the end of the Cold War (Van de Walle, 2004: 6). Measures of 
democracy and civil liberties can be found through Freedom House’s Freedom in the 
World Reports. These annual reports rate the level of political rights and protection of 
                                                 
23
 Due to considerable variation of these variables between the panel years of the dataset, mean 
substitution to fill in the missing data across the entire time periods is not a suitable option.   
47 
 
civil liberties within a state on a scale of one to seven, with the measures being inverted 
with a score of one representing “free” and a score of seven representing “not free.” 
Freedom House’s wide use in studies points to its reliability and validity to the analysis 
(Berthe´lemy and Tichit, 2004; Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Tuman and Ayoub, 2004). 
 Besides political ratings, economic ratings are also important to this perspective. 
A push for more sound economic policy has been suggested as a potential solution to 
SSA’s poor economic conditions (Burnside and Dollar, 2002; Collier and Dollar, 2002). 
While economic policy ratings exist through the WDI, they are fairly recent and do not 
cover enough years to be effective in this analysis. Instead, a measure of trade as a 
percentage of a recipient’s GDP should show how open a recipient’s economic market is, 
which may be considered to be a sign of sound economic policy (Moyo, 2009). 
Theoretically, a state with a high portion of trade would have a more open and market-
friendly economy.  
 The hypotheses that can be derived under the development interest perspective 
include: 
H3) The U.S. provides more foreign aid to SSA states with higher levels 
of economic need. 
 
H4) The U.S. provides more foreign aid to SSA states with higher levels 
of freedom. 
 
H5) The U.S. provides more foreign aid to SSA states with higher levels 
of trade openness. 
 
Each of these hypotheses explains the development interest of the SSA states by showing 
the basic premises of the recipients’ needs, level of freedom, and economic openness. 
The need hypothesis, H3, explains the U.S. foreign aid as going to states which are 
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considered to be worse off economically through the variable GDP per capita. If this 
hypothesis were found to be correct, then one would find an inverse relationship between 
GDP per capita and the foreign aid allocated to the region.  
The next hypothesis, H4, states that the level of freedom determines the amount 
of foreign aid a recipient receives, with freer states receiving higher amounts of aid. The 
F.H. average score variable is operationalized by using an average score a recipient state 
receives from Freedom House’s Political Rights and Civil Liberties surveys. As Freedom 
House scores freer states with lower scores, one would expect to find an inverse 
relationship between the amount of foreign aid going to SSA states and their Freedom 
House score if this hypothesis was found to be correct.   
The final hypothesis under this perspective, H5, states that U.S. foreign aid is 
determined by the level of openness which SSA states have towards international trade. 
The Total Trade/GDP variable is operationalized by taking the total amount of trade of 
the recipient as a percentage of the recipient’s GDP. For this hypothesis to be correct, 
then one would need to find a positive relationship between foreign aid allocated and the 
trade openness variable. 
The hypotheses under this perspective accurately test the underlying aspects of 
the development interests of the recipient states. Their variables are valid and are reliable 
in measuring recipients’ needs, level of freedom, and trade openness. While the trade 
openness hypothesis represents an important interest that deserves to be tested in its 
effect on U.S. foreign aid, its multicollinearity with the trade hypothesis from the 
strategic interest perspective, H1, has the potential to cause methodological problems 
within the analysis. To avoid any problems in the analysis, this hypothesis, H5, will not 
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be included in the analysis. This hypothesis will be tested in an additional model in the 
Appendix.  
War on Terror Hypotheses 
 As this study focuses on the effect of the War on Terror, additional hypotheses 
which are based around specific interests for the U.S. in the War on Terror need to be 
tested. As the U.S. would wish to prevent the rise of global terrorist threats from 
emerging in SSA, its foreign aid may be allocated around specific interests connected to 
the threat of terrorism. These interests include the level of stability within a recipient 
state, previous terrorist attacks in recipient states, any cooperation between recipient 
states and the U.S.’s counterterrorism operations, and the size of Muslim populations 
within recipients that are susceptible to supporting terrorist movements. As the threat 
from international terrorism, with a special focus on Islamic terrorism, has dictated U.S. 
foreign policy since the 9/11 attacks (Dollar, 2008), one should expect this influence to 
spread to U.S.’s foreign aid allocation decisions. Looking at the period of 2001 through 
2008, any significant findings of the hypotheses derived from this perspective will reveal 
any important impact which the War on Terror has on U.S. foreign aid. 
 The hypotheses that can be tested under this perspective include:  
H6: The U.S. provides more foreign aid to SSA states that are at risk of 
failing. 
 
H7: The U.S. provides more foreign aid to SSA states that have been 
experienced terrorist attacks. 
 
H8: The U.S. provides more foreign aid to SSA states which have 
cooperated with the U.S.’s counterterrorism operations. 
 
H9: The U.S. provides more foreign aid to SSA states with large Muslim 
populations.  
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Each of these hypotheses represents an important interest which the U.S. may focus on in 
its foreign aid allocation during the War on Terror.  
The first hypothesis, H6, represents the biggest threat the U.S. views from the 
region in regards to the spread of terrorism (U.S. National Security Strategy, 2002). The 
threat of failed and failing states has brought much attention to national security experts, 
and measuring how foreign aid has been impacted by this threat is important to show the 
effect the War on Terror has had on the U.S.’s foreign aid allocation. Measuring whether 
a state can be considered to be failing or failed is a difficult task. Some scholars prefer to 
use the capability of state’s governments in providing basic services (Rotberg, 2004), 
while others rely on a violent disruption in the political stability of a state (PITF, 2010). 
Neither of these types of measurement accurately portrays state failure completely 
(Howard, 2010), which questions the validity and reliability of any variable that would be 
used to measure the level of instability.  
The measures from the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) datasets (Marshall 
et al, 2009) do appear to present a more valid and reliable measure of instability. The fact 
the PITF is funded by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) indicates its validity, as the 
U.S. government is relying on these measures in its own intelligence analyses. The PITF 
measures instability in a state by recording whether a state experiences a revolutionary 
war, an ethnic war, an adverse or disruptive regime transition, or genocides and /or 
politicides during a given year.24 Using the data from the PITF’s annual datasets, the 
State Failure dummy variable is operationalized by coding a recipient state that has 
                                                 
24
 The PITF datasets list whether a state experiences a political disruption as a one in the year 
which the disruption occurred. The PITF datasets do not list years in which no instability event occurred. 
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experienced one of these political disruptions in given year as a (1). Any SSA state that 
did not experience one of these disruptions in a given year would be coded as a zero. If 
this hypothesis was proven to be correct, then one would expect to find a positive 
relationship between the state instability dummy variable and the allocated foreign aid. 
The second hypothesis, H7, looks at the direct experience which recipient states 
have had with terrorist attacks. Measuring the number of terrorist attacks which have 
occurred within a recipient state is an important indicator of the level of threat of 
terrorism is within the region.25 The Num. of Terrorist Attacks variable is operationalized 
by a simple count of the number of terrorist attacks inside a recipient state during the 
selected years, recorded in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). For this hypothesis to 
be correct, one would expect to find a positive relationship between the number of attacks 
and foreign aid that has been allocated. 
The third hypothesis, H8, looks at the cooperation which the SSA states have with 
any of the U.S.’s counterterrorism operations in the region. Since the beginning of the 
War on Terror, the U.S. has started several regional security programs to build up the 
capacity of the SSA states to combat against terrorist threats. These regional programs 
include the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, 
Operation Enduring Freedom Trans Sahara (TSCPT), the Combined Joint Task Force-
Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), and other counterterrorism programs. 26 The 
                                                 
25
 An additional variable, measuring the number of casualties from terrorist expressed as a ratio 
per 100,000 individuals of a recipient’s population was tested in separate trials. Results produced were 
insignificant, and not included in the final model.  
26
 States which were part of the “Coalition of the Willing” in the Iraq War were also included in 
this variable.  
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operationalization of the Cooperation with U.S. Counterterrorism dummy variable for 
this hypothesis consists of developing a dummy variable that codes a recipient state’s 
cooperation with any of these operations as a (1), zero otherwise. Taking part in the 
U.S.’s security operations would appear to create good standing between a recipient and 
the U.S., and rewarding this cooperation with higher amounts of foreign aid may be a 
reasonable notion for the U.S. This line of thinking shows the validity of the variable 
being tested in this hypothesis. For this hypothesis to be correct, one should see a positive 
relationship between the cooperation dummy variable and the allocated foreign aid.  
The final hypothesis, H9, asserts that the size of the Muslim population within a 
SSA state affects the amount of foreign aid being allocated to the state, with recipient 
states with large Muslim populations receiving larger amounts of foreign aid.27 This 
hypothesis is an explicit reference towards the focus on Islamic terrorism by the U.S., 
rather than general terrorist groups. The giving of extra foreign aid to states with large 
Muslim populations can have several rationalizations. First, the U.S. may want to win 
support from Muslim communities through aid to increase its soft power against the 
threat of terrorism (Radlet, 2003; Nye, 2003). Second, the U.S. may want to provide more 
aid to these states with large Muslim populations to help these states’ governments build 
up their capacity in handling potential Islamic terrorist threats that may emerge. Some 
recent studies have relied on this variable in testing U.S. foreign aid allocation during the 
War on Terror (Moss, Roodman, and Standley, 2005), providing some validity towards 
                                                 
27
 The Muslim population variable has no threshold to constitute a large size population. The 
measure is a simple percentage of the Muslim population within each recipient state.  
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its use.28 The operationalization of the %Muslim variable for this hypothesis is the size of 
a recipient state’s Muslim population as a percentage of its total population. If this 
hypothesis is proven to be valid, one would expect to see a positive relationship between 
the size of the Muslim population and the amount of foreign aid allocated.  
 Each of these hypothesis provide important insight into the potential threat of 
terrorism the U.S. views to be in SSA and how the U.S. may allocate foreign aid in an 
attempt to contain this threat. While the validity of these variables may be strong, their 
inclusion in the model together may create potential methodological problems. To avoid 
problems of multicollinearity, and to keep to a more parsimonious model, this study will 
rely on only the state failure hypothesis, H6, in the final model. The other hypotheses will 
be included as additional models presented in the Appendix. 
 
Final Model of Analysis on U.S. Foreign Aid Allocation to SSA 
The final model of analysis for this study on U.S. foreign aid allocation to SSA 
will test the following hypotheses: 
H1) The U.S. provides more foreign aid to SSA states that have stronger 
trade relationships with the U.S. 
 
H3) The U.S. provides more foreign aid to SSA states with greater 
economic needs. 
 
H4) The U.S. provides more foreign aid to SSA states with higher levels 
of freedom. 
 
                                                 
28
 Moss only finds significance with this variable when measuring all of the U.S. foreign aid 
allocation and not controlling for aid going to Iraq and Afghanistan. Moss does test SSA separately, but 
does not include this variable.  Fleck and Kilby (2008) discuss the use of a Muslim population variable, but 
do not find any significant findings. 
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H6) The U.S. provides more foreign aid to SSA states that are at risk of 
failing. 
 
These four hypotheses provide a strong representation of the three perspectives on U.S. 
foreign aid. To control for the effect in which previous allocation amounts have in 
determining foreign aid amounts and to control for autocorrelation in the model, this 
model will also include a lagged dependent variable, labeled as ODA/GDP_lagged one 
year, as one of the independent variables.29  
 To test each of these hypotheses, each of their corresponding variables will be 
tested for significance in determining the dependent variable of U.S. foreign aid to the 
SSA states (referred to as ODA/GDP in the analysis). This dependent variable consists of 
the total amount of net disbursements30 from official development assistance the U.S. has 
allocated to a recipient SSA state in a given year. To control for the differences in 
population and geography, the dependent variable is shown as a ratio of foreign aid to a 
recipient’s annual GDP. To show causality of the independent variables in determining 
the dependent variable, it is important to lag each independent variable by one year 
(Feeny and McGillivray, 2002). It is also important to control for inflation. To do this, the 
U.S. net disbursements have been adjusted by the U.S.’s consumer price index (CPI) 
(2005 constant dollars) (Dollar and Alesina, 2000). All other economic variables, 
including the recipients’ GDP in the dependent variable, have been adjusted by each of 
the recipients’ own CPI (2005 constant dollars). 
                                                 
29
 Each additional hypothesis will be run in separate analyses, with each hypothesis replacing only 
one of the primary hypotheses listed above with the other primary hypotheses remaining in the model. 
30
 Recorded in USD millions (constant dollars 2005=1). 
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Tables 3 and 4 show the summary statistics of the variables included in the 
primary model as well as a correlation matrix. These statistics are split between the two 
separate time periods.31 The following chapter will now present the results of the panel 
analyses from the models presented above. Running the analyses on the two separate time 
periods, one can clearly see a change in purpose of U.S. foreign aid to SSA after the start 
of the War on Terror. The start of this security environment also showed the U.S. having 
a specific focus on certain interest in the War on Terror. This focus has been limited to 
the threat of failing states though, and not other specific interests under the War on 
Terror. 
 
 
Table 3 
                                                 
31
 Note, the mean value for the dependent variable in the first period, 1992-2000, is extremely 
high. While this value should be less than 1.0, certain SSA states which suffered from high levels of 
inflation during this period have inflated the mean value of the dependent variable. A separate trial which 
excluded these high inflation states produced similar results to the analysis with these states included.  
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Table 4 
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CHAPTER4 
FINDINGS 
The results of the analyses shall tell us whether the War on Terror has or has not 
had an effect on U.S. foreign aid allocation to SSA by showing us any changes in the 
selected variables between the two models before and after the start of the War on Terror. 
These results will also aid our attempt in trying to explain U.S. foreign aid allocation 
around the perspectives of foreign aid either being allocated to serve the strategic interest 
of the U.S. or the development interests of the recipient states. In regards to the 
applicability of these perspectives, our findings indicate that the U.S. has not followed its 
own strategic interest based around the economic interest variables during both time 
periods. These results indicate SSA does not hold strategic economic interest to the U.S. 
at this time. The findings also indicate that the U.S.’s focus on the development interests 
of the recipients is not a complete explanation of U.S. foreign aid to SSA, as the 
regression analyses produced mixed results in regards to the economic need variable and 
the political and economic capability variables. While the economic need variable 
appears to have an effect on U.S. aid, other development variables measuring good 
economic and political policies did not turn out. This would suggest that while the U.S. 
has been at times focused on the level of development need in SSA, it has not been 
concerned with how capable the recipient states are in using the aid efficiently.  
With respect to the effect of the War on Terror on foreign aid, our findings show 
several changes in U.S. foreign aid allocation to the region after the start of this new 
international security environment. A difference between significant allocation trends 
with states at risk of failure can be clearly seen between the two time periods. This 
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observation can be confirmed with two separate variables that measure instability. Other 
variables tied to the War on Terror either did not come out as significant indicators or did 
not change between the two time periods. These results would suggest a limited effect the 
threat of terrorism in SSA has on U.S. foreign aid to the region. The results of the 
primary models for this study are listed in Table 5, with alternative models with the 
additional variables presented in Table 6 with their complete results listed in the 
Appendix.32 The findings from these models will be discussed in detail below.  
 
 
Table 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32
 The partial fixed effects models for both time periods includes dummy variables for SSA states 
that were perceived to have a high amount of influence on the model. The regression analysis for the first 
time period includes dummy variables for Angola, Burundi, Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Gabon, Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles, and Uganda. The second time period includes dummy 
variables for Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, and Sudan. The coefficients, 
standard errors, and significance levels for the state dummy variables can be found in the complete models 
listed in the appendix. 
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Results of U.S. Foreign Aid to Sub-Saharan Arica before the War on Terror 
 The regression results from the model consisting of the period before the start of 
the War on Terror, 1992-2000, present an interesting picture of how U.S. foreign aid was 
allocated to SSA after the end of the Cold War. The results of this model indicate that the 
U.S. did not follow its economic interest, providing less aid on average to SSA states that 
engaged in trade with the U.S. The SSA states’ development interests do not appear to 
offer a clear explanation of U.S. foreign aid to region either, as the desired economic and 
political indicators did not produce the hypothesized results. Instead, the results indicate 
that the U.S. focused on providing more aid on average to relatively better-off states 
compared to the poorest states in the region. The expected results of the U.S. not focusing 
on states at risk of failing were also confirmed in the model. A more in depth discussion 
of the results of the variables is provided below.  
 
 
Table 6 
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The U.S.’s Strategic Interest 
 According to the hypotheses under the U.S.’s strategic interest perspective, the 
U.S. should provide more foreign aid on average to SSA states that offered some kind of 
strategic economic interest. The variable that was relied on in the primary models to test 
the actuality of this perspective is the Total U.S. Trade/GDP variable. For this variable’s 
hypothesis to be accepted, one would need to see a significant positive result from the 
regression analysis. The coefficient for U.S. Trade/GDP is negative and significant at the 
.05 level. This result suggests that the U.S. provided less aid on average to SSA states 
which engaged in high levels of trade with the U.S. These results are not surprising, as 
increased trade with the region has been considered to act as an alternative to aid to the 
region (AGOA, 2009).  
Other strategic interest variables that were run in separate regression analyses also 
show a similar relationship with foreign aid. The coefficients for the Oil Exporting 
dummy variable and the Log of Oil Exports to the U.S. variable both produced significant 
results with negative values. These results show that the U.S. provided less foreign aid on 
average to states which exported oil to the U.S. These results also indicate that the U.S. 
was not using its foreign aid to help develop potential oil resources on a major scale. It 
will be necessary to compare these findings with the findings from the models after the 
start of the War on Terror to see if the U.S.’s insecurity about the Middle East affected its 
level of focus on African oil. From these results, however, one must reject the individual 
hypotheses for the strategic interest variables during this period as well as reject the 
strategic interest perspective in explaining U.S. foreign aid to SSA before the start of the 
War on Terror. The results from all of the strategic interest perspective are not consistent 
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with this perspective on foreign aid. These results are more consistent with humanitarian 
views on the purpose of foreign aid though.  
The Development Interests of the SSA States 
 According to the development interest perspective explaining U.S. foreign aid 
allocation, the U.S. is to allocate aid to the SSA states based around their need for 
development as well as their capability for using such aid efficiently. The results from 
this first model indicate that the U.S. was not influenced heavily by the determinants of 
the recipients’ development interests during this time period. The variables that were 
included in the primary models for this perspective are the GDP per capita variable, 
measuring economic and development need, and the Freedom House average score 
variable, measuring the level of democracy and the protection of human rights. The 
results for these two variables indicate a wrong type of relationship in regards to the 
recipients’ need and no significant relationship between U.S. foreign aid allocation and a 
concern for democracy and human rights. 
 If the development need hypothesis is to be accepted, one would expect to see the 
U.S. providing more aid to SSA states with lower GDP per capita values. As the 
coefficient for this variable received a positive score with significance at the .05 level, it 
can clearly be seen that the U.S. followed the exact opposite path during this time 
period.33 While the development need hypothesis that was presented must be rejected in 
this model, these particular results do not invalidate the development interest perspective. 
Since this analysis only focuses on SSA, no states included in the analysis can be viewed 
                                                 
33
 An alternative variable measuring real GDP per capita squared was tested in a separate analysis 
to test for non-linearity in the GDP per capita variable. The results from the GDP per capita squared 
variable were non-significant and not included in the final model. 
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as not needing development assistance. The results from this variable may have to do 
with the U.S. not wanting to allocate its foreign aid to weak and instable states which 
would most likely waste the aid away through corruption.  
The other variables measuring the capability of using foreign aid efficiently 
should have matched up with the GDP per capita findings if our explanation of the GDP 
variable is accurate. The Freedom House variable, which hypothesizes that democratic 
states which protect human rights would use aid more efficiently and receive more 
foreign aid on average, has produced positive results with no significance. One would 
need to see negative results with significance if the hypothesis is to be accepted.34 This 
study must reject this variable’s hypothesis, as the Freedom House’s scores had no 
influence on U.S. foreign aid allocation during this time. An explanation for these results 
may be simply that the U.S. is not concerned with how recipient states are governed or 
the amount of freedom once other influences in the model have been taken into account. 
This explanation would go against the stated desires of U.S. policymakers (Korb, 2008), 
but matches similar findings on U.S. aid allocation (Neumayer, 2003; Lebovic and 
Voeten, 2009).35  
 The final variable measuring the capability of recipient states to use foreign aid 
efficiently was the Total Trade/GDP variable. This variable, measuring how open a 
recipient state is to foreign trade and the soundness of its economic policy, produced 
                                                 
34
 Again, Freedom House scores are inverted with more democratic states with higher civil 
liberties receiving lower scores.  
35
 The SSA state dummy variables included the partial fixed effects model may have an effect on 
this variable. A panel regression model that includes no state dummy variables (not included in this study) 
produced significant results with negative values. A full fixed effects model (also not included) produced 
non-significant results with a negative value.   
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similar results compared to the other trade variables found under the strategic interest 
perspective. The negative significant results for this variable cause one to reject the 
hypothesis that the U.S. would provide more aid on average to states with more open 
economies and sound economic policies. Its negative results, along with the other trade 
variables, may indicate that international trade in SSA was little priority for the U.S. 
during this time period. Its wrongly hypothesized results, along with the results of the 
other development interest variables, also cause one to question the applicability of the 
recipients’ development interest as a major influence on U.S. foreign aid allocation 
before the start of the War on Terror. 
Pre-Effect of the War on Terror 
 In order to see a more direct effect of the War on Terror on U.S. foreign aid, one 
must first see how variables specifically tied to the threat of international terrorism 
influenced U.S. aid to SSA before the start of the War on Terror. The coefficient for the 
State Failure dummy variable, measuring the presence of political instability within a 
recipient state, received negative significant results, indicating the U.S. was not providing 
more aid on average to states at risk of failure. These results may give life to the 
development interest perspective, as the U.S. may have not wanted to allocate money to 
an unstable country. The results for the coefficient for the GDP per capita variable’s 
results matchup with the State Failure variable’s results, as they both indicate the U.S. did 
not provide more foreign aid on average to states that experienced high political and 
economic instability. This confirms that the U.S. had no interest in failing states before 
the start of the War on Terror. If the War on Terror is to have an actual effect on U.S. 
foreign aid, one should expect to see these two results to be reversed in the next model.  
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 Other variables tied to the War on Terror also produced the expected results of not 
having any positive influence on U.S. foreign aid during this time. The Muslim 
population coefficient received negative significant results, indicating that the U.S. on 
average allocated more money to SSA states with smaller Muslim populations. The 
Number of Terrorist Attacks variable did not receive significance in the model, indicating 
that it was not a major focus of the U.S.36 As with the State Failure variable and GDP per 
capita variable, this study expects these results to change in the model if the War on 
Terror had an overarching effect on U.S. foreign aid. 
 The most telling variable results from this first model can be clearly seen as the 
lagged dependent variable of ODA/GDP. This variable received the highest significance, 
at the .001 level, indicating the previous year’s allocation amount affects the next year’s 
amount. The adjusted R2 value of .96 provides even greater evidence of this determinant’s 
influence, as its inclusion allows the model to explain nearly 100% of U.S. foreign aid 
allocation to SSA from 1992-2000. These results are not particularly surprising, as many 
have found the best predictor of any government allocated budget to be the previous 
year’s amount allocated (Griffin and Enos, 1970: 315).   
 
Results of U.S. Foreign Aid to SSA after the Start of the War on Terror 
 The findings from the second model, consisting of the years 2002-2008, show 
interesting results in respect to the U.S.’s changing priorities towards SSA during the 
War on Terror. As the War on Terror is assumed to have such a major impact on U.S. 
                                                 
36
 These results are interesting though, as some of the biggest terrorist attacks conducted against 
the U.S. abroad occurred in SSA during this time period.   
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foreign policy, this study hypothesizes that any significant changes in U.S. foreign aid 
allocation practices after 2001 are the result of the War on Terror influencing U.S. 
foreign aid. The most significant changes in U.S. foreign aid to the region can be seen 
with more aid on average being allocated to states which are at risk of failing. This 
change can be seen in the State Failure variable and the GDP per capita variable. Other 
changes include significant results for the Freedom House variable, yet in the wrong 
direction, and the lack of influence from the lagged dependent variable on the model. The 
other variables tied to the effect of the War on Terror hypothesis did not turnout, 
suggesting a limited effect of the War on Terror. Going through the perspectives once 
more in this new time period, one shall see if the purpose of U.S. foreign aid changed 
after the start of the War on Terror. 
The U.S.’s Strategic Interest 
 The variables under the strategic interest perspective did not change from their 
results in the earlier model. The coefficient for the Total U.S. Trade/GDP remained 
significant, at a higher level than the previous model, and remained negative. Again, the 
U.S. is providing more aid on average to states that did not take part in a lot of trade with 
the U.S. The oil variables also remained significant, but with lower levels, and were 
negative as well. These results and the results from the previous period indicate that the 
U.S.’s strategic interest has not had an influential effect on U.S. foreign aid to SSA. The 
start of the War on Terror has not had an effect on the U.S.’s economic focus towards 
SSA, as the U.S. is not looking towards what it can gain from SSA through the allocation 
of its foreign aid. 
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The Development Interest of the SSA States 
 The variables measuring the development interest of the recipient states present 
some interesting results in the second model. The coefficient for the GDP per capita 
variable remained significant, but changed its direction. During this timeframe under the 
War on Terror, the U.S. provided more aid on average to states that had a greater 
economic and development need. This drastic change in focus by the U.S. may be 
understood as an effect of the War on Terror, causing U.S. policymakers to focus on 
states with the worst economic conditions in the hope of preventing these states from 
failing and falling into chaos. 
 The variables measuring the recipients’ capability of using aid efficiently received 
some interesting results from the analysis. As the coefficient for the Total Trade/GDP 
variable did not drastically change, though it did increase in significance, this study can 
reject the notion that the U.S. focuses on sound economic policies of the recipients when 
allocating foreign aid to the region. The Freedom House score variable produced an 
interesting result, as this variable received a positive score with significance at the .1 
level. These results indicate that the U.S. provided more foreign aid on average to states 
that were less democratic and violated the human rights of their citizens. These results 
again go against the hypothesis that the U.S. focused on democracy and protecting human 
rights with its foreign aid. These findings may be tied to the new focus on state failure 
and instability, as the majority of states which experienced some form of instability have 
poor Freedom House scores.37   
                                                 
37
 Only two states with Freedom House ratings of “free” were recorded to experience instability in 
the State Failure variable (South Africa and Mali).  
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  Reviewing the results from all of the variables under the development interest 
perspective, this perspective can be accepted as explaining U.S. foreign aid allocation to 
SSA based around the premise of the U.S. providing its foreign aid to the neediest SSA 
states. This acceptance is supported by the results of the GDP per capita variable. This 
perspective cannot be accepted based around the premise of the U.S. providing its foreign 
aid to states that have the best political and economic policies to use the aid efficiently. 
The negative results of the Total Trade/GDP variable and the focus on undemocratic 
states in the U.S.’s aid allocation forces one to reject this part of the perspective. 
Post-Effect of the War on Terror 
 The variables tied to the War on Terror show some significant changes in their 
results compared to the previous model. The most significant changes can be seen in the 
State Failure variable. The coefficient for this variable received the highest level of 
significance and is positive. These results indicate that the U.S. provided more aid on 
average to states which experienced some form of a political instability, opposite of the 
previous model focusing on before the War on Terror. These results suggest that the War 
on Terror has had an effect on U.S. foreign aid, as the need to prevent states from failing 
by ensuring their development was identified as one of the pillars of U.S. national 
security under the War on Terror (U.S. National Security Strategy, 2002).  
 The other variables tied to the War on Terror did not change in their results from 
the previous model. The coefficient for the Muslim population variable remained 
negative, indicating that the U.S. provided less aid on average to states with large Muslim 
populations. This result goes against the belief that the U.S. would allocate its foreign aid 
in an attempt to increase its soft power and image in the Muslim world. As it does not 
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make sense that the U.S. would intentionally provide less aid to larger Muslim 
populations, other explanations probably exist to explain these results. A likely 
explanation for this result is that many of the Muslim-majority countries, such as 
Senegal, Mali, Chad and Niger, are former French colonies and in France’s sphere of 
influence.38  
 The coefficient for the Number of Terrorist Attacks variable is not significant in 
this model, indicating no change from the previous time period. These results may tell us 
that the U.S. does not view terrorism within SSA as much as a threat as it views terrorism 
in other regions, such as the Middle East. The U.S. may also focus on dealing with this 
kind of threat through its military assistance rather than its development assistance. 
Improving SSA states’ counterterrorism capability through military assistance is highly 
plausible and deserves further investigation to see if terrorism has an effect on this form 
of aid. Another variable tied to regional security is the Cooperation with U.S. 
Counterterrorism variable. This variable also produced non-significant results, indicating 
that the U.S. did not provide more foreign aid as a reward to the states that took part in 
these counterterrorism operations. As some of these programs were tied to military 
training, these states may have had an increase in the amount of military assistance 
allocated to them. 
 A final change that can be seen between the results of the two models is the loss 
of significance for the lagged dependent variable in the period after the start of the War 
on Terror. As this variable earned the highest level of significance in the first model, its 
                                                 
38
 Another plausible explanation of this pattern of U.S. aid allocation is the fact that many SSA 
states with large Muslim populations are not included in the analysis due to missing data. These include 
Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan.  
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non-significant status in the second model indicates that the U.S. did not follow previous 
years’ foreign aid allocations in determining aid levels. The much smaller adjusted R2 for 
this model reveals this missing influence. If the U.S. has not been following previous 
years’ foreign aid allocation amounts, then foreign aid to the SSA states would have 
varied greatly year to year for an unknown reason. These results beg the question even 
more of what actually influences U.S. foreign aid allocation to SSA during the War on 
Terror.  
Reviewing the results of the different variables in the model covering the period 
of 2002-2008, one can clearly see the effect that the War on Terror has had on U.S. 
foreign aid allocation to SSA. As the U.S. has shifted its focus to states at risk of failing 
and provided more aid to the neediest states, there is evidence that the War on Terror has 
influenced U.S. foreign aid in a profound manner. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 The results of our analysis presented some interesting explanations of U.S. 
foreign aid to SSA. Reviewing the differences between the two time periods, one can 
clearly see a change in focus for the U.S. in regards to states at risk of failure after the 
start of the War on Terror. This fact can be seen with the U.S. providing more aid on 
average to states with lower economic wealth as well as to states that have experienced 
some form of political instability. The results provide mixed support for the perspectives 
that have been used to explain U.S. foreign aid. The results do not show any evidence 
that U.S. economic interests or the development interests of the SSA states influenced US 
foreign aid levels across the entire time period. The lack of concern the U.S. has shown 
about the recipients’ political and economic capability to use foreign aid efficiently also 
causes us to question if the U.S. is truly motivated by the development interests of the 
recipient states. The fact that a change in focus for the U.S. occurred between the start of 
the War on Terror does not prove the War on Terror actually had an effect on U.S. 
foreign aid to the region either, as other potential explanations may exist. This concluding 
chapter will review the results of this analysis and look at the possible implications which 
these findings may have for U.S. foreign aid to SSA. Other explanations of the results 
will also be reviewed to assess if the War on Terror has had an actual effect on U.S. 
foreign aid. 
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Implications of the Findings on U.S. Foreign Aid to SSA 
The findings on the determinants of U.S. foreign aid to SSA before and after the 
start of the War on Terror tell us many things about that on which the U.S. has and has 
not focused on when considering its aid allocation towards the region. The results of the 
analysis reveal much about the actual purposes of U.S. foreign aid as well as the U.S.’s 
foreign policy towards SSA. This study can find no evidence that the U.S., before the 
start of the War on Terror, provided foreign aid on the basis of advancing U.S. economic 
interests in the region. The results show that the relationships between the oil and trade 
variables and foreign aid levels are just the opposite of those hypothesized. These results 
remain the same in the period after the start of the War on Terror. With both sets of 
results, one cannot accept the argument that the U.S.’s economic interests influence its 
foreign aid to the region. 
While the U.S.’s economic interests do not appear to have a positive impact on 
aid levels to SSA countries, one cannot all together reject the strategic interest 
perspective as an explanation of U.S. foreign aid. Because this study did not include a 
strategic political variable in the model, one cannot know if the U.S. bases its foreign aid 
on specific political interests it may have towards SSA. U.S. political interest variables 
for SSA are not easily conceptualized. While political interest has been easier 
conceptualized during periods such as the Cold War, with variables measuring such 
things as alliances, the post-Cold War period does not offer many visible interests the 
U.S. would have towards SSA. Some studies have relied on the level of military 
assistance given to a SSA state from the U.S. an indicator of the level of U.S. interest in a 
state (Kilby and Fleck, 2008). The validity of this variable is questionable though. While 
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SSA has been viewed to not have a strategic value towards the U.S. in the past 
(Kraxberger, 2005; Schraeder, 2006), the U.S. may reevaluate its view of SSA in the 
coming years as the threat of international terrorism continues. This reevaluation may 
also be the result of the U.S.’s unease with China’s growing level of influence in the 
region. 
Based on the analysis, the variables associated with the development interest 
perspective do not go very far in explaining the U.S.’s aid allocation to SSA. While the 
coefficient for the economic need variable is negative and significant in the period after 
the start of the War on Terror, as hypothesized, it is positive and significant in the 
previous time period. Moreover, the results reveal that the level of democracy as 
measured by Freedom House and trade openness do not have the hypothesized 
relationships with aid levels. The GDP per capita variable performs as expected in the 
analysis, but these results may be explained by the U.S.’s concern about potential state 
failure in the region. This concern is probably driven more by the U.S.’s strategic interest 
to ensure its own national security by preventing terrorism than the development interest 
of the recipients. Trade openness may also fail to influence aid levels due to the small 
role that the SSA states play in the international trade market. As SSA becomes more 
involved in the international markets, this interest may change in the coming years. 
The findings concerning the level of democracy as measured by Freedom House 
have important implications. The U.S.’s lack of concern with democracy and human 
rights is contrary to the U.S.’s own foreign aid policies and national security interests. 
While the period before the War on Terror shows no pattern between aid allocation and 
the level of freedom in the recipient states, the second period shows a pattern of more aid 
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going to nondemocratic states with high levels of human rights violations. These 
particular results are especially problematic, as encouraging the spread of democracy in 
the world became one of the pillars of U.S. national security in 2006 (U.S. National 
Security Strategy, 2006).39 This disregard for democracy and human rights creates the 
appearance of U.S. hypocrisy. These results do have some logic behind them though. As 
failing states tend to be less democratic than more stable states, one should not be 
surprised to find the U.S. overlooking democracy with their main focus on instability in 
the region. 
The most important finding of this study is the observed changes in the 
determinants of foreign aid allocation to SSA countries after the start of the War on 
Terror. There are good reasons to attribute these changes to the U.S.’s focus in the War 
on Terror on the threat of global terrorism in failed states. The emphasis on providing 
more aid on average to the poorest states as well as providing more aid to states which 
experienced some form of political instability match the change of focus in U.S. national 
security towards failing states in 2002. These results provide support for the assertion that 
the U.S. followed its national security policy directives by providing more aid to states at 
risk of failing. The other variables tied to the War on Terror did not perform as 
hypothesized, indicating the limited effect of the War on Terror on U.S. foreign aid. As 
the U.S.’s struggle against terrorism in the region is based around both development and 
security, one may speculate that the U.S. may base its military assistance to SSA around 
these other variables and this study advocates further investigation of the issue. 
                                                 
39
 Democracy actually replaced development as a pillar of U.S. national security in 2006 after 
development’s founding as one of the three pillars of security in 2002. This change towards a focus on 
democracy may be the result of the U.S. justifying the continuing of its operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
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The biggest implication of the potential effect of the War on Terror on U.S. 
foreign aid may be the chaos which it has caused in fueling the transformation of U.S. aid 
during this period (Lancaster, 2008). After the start of the War on Terror and the 
reevaluation of foreign aid as a tool to fight the threat of terrorism, the Bush 
administration initiated the reorganization of the U.S.’s foreign aid institutions in the 
attempt to promote more effective development. This reorganization can be seen with the 
placing of USAID under the control of the State Department and the establishment of 
independent development organizations, such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation. 
While the intention of the Bush administration may have been to produce more 
development, its actions have left the U.S.’s aid structure in a disorganized state with 
many policy questions still to be answered.  
Our findings may reflect some of this chaos, as the lagged dependent variable, 
representing the previous amount of foreign aid given to a recipient, lost its significance 
as an indicator of U.S. aid in period after the start of the War on Terror. See the table 
provided in Appendix 3. As the table in the Appendix shows, the percent of change in the 
amount of aid allocated to the SSA states from year to year jumped sporadically with 
many of the SSA states. Some examples include: Guinea-Bissau’s aid levels dropping 
significantly from 2003-2004, then increasing to over 1,000% of the previous year’s 
amount allocated in 2005; Central African Republic’s aid level increasing over 3,700% of 
the previous year’s amount allocated in 2004; and São Tomé and Príncipe’s aid level 
increased over 3,000% of the previous year’s amount allocated in 2004.40  
                                                 
40
 There are potential explanations for these specific cases. In 2003, Guinea-Bissau and Central 
African Republic both experienced a coup. The significant drop in aid at this time may have been used to 
serve as a punishment towards the new regimes. The reestablishment of elections in both states coincides 
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As the previous amount of aid was not used as at least a starting basis for each 
year’s aid levels, these aid levels are varying wildly year to year. This high level of 
variation between years may indicate the U.S. is relying on multiple indicators, the 
majority unknown to this study, when determining aid allocation levels. This may point 
to the lack of a universal equation for the U.S. to go by to determine foreign aid levels. 
As this study has no data to validate this claim, it is recommended for further study of 
this issue. 
Other Potential Explanations of Changes in U.S. Foreign Aid to SSA 
 While this study has assumed the changes in U.S. foreign aid allocation to SSA 
between the time periods 1992-2000 and 2002-2008 have been the result of the War on 
Terror influencing U.S. aid practices, other potential explanations may exist for this 
change. The most obvious of these potential alternative explanations is the differences 
between the two administrations which held power during these time periods. With 
President Clinton in office during the first time period and President Bush in office 
during the second time period, these two administrations policies towards the use of 
foreign aid and SSA may offer better explanations to the change in focus than the effect 
of the War on Terror. These two Presidents have been described as holding different 
views towards international relations, with Clinton being described as an idealist and 
Bush as a realist (Schrader, 2006), indicating that the U.S. would provide aid based on 
the development interest of the recipients during the first time period and based on its 
strategic interest during the second period. Our findings do not support these 
                                                                                                                                                 
with the increase of aid. São Tomé and Príncipe did not suffer from any type of state failure during its large 
aid increase. The state does have a developing oil industry though, which the U.S. may wish to take 
advantage of.  
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expectations. In fact, the findings are nearly the opposite of what one would expect had 
Clinton been pursuing an idealist agenda and Bush a realist agenda.  
The change in aid allocation may also be the result of these different 
administrations holding on to a specific level of interest towards the region. While 
Clinton presented some early attention to SSA and promised to help with development 
during SSA’s “renaissance” (French, 1998), the Clinton administration eventually 
showed little action towards the region (Tucker, 1999). President Bush, on the other 
hand, has been described as focusing on SSA and its development, based off of his 
religious views and a sense of moral duty (Associated Press, 2008).  
Another alternative explanation for the change in U.S. aid allocation to SSA may 
be the renewed international focus on SSA’s lack of development from celebrities and 
politicians. From Bono to Tony Blair, more individuals have focused on the problems of 
SSA since the start of the millennium. The U.S.’s new effort against HIV/AIDS in the 
region may be explained by this new phenomenon, as the focus on the disease has been 
part of an international effort to reduce the amount of damage which the AIDS has had on 
the region.  
 
Going Forward 
The alternative explanations described above may provide some insight into 
changes in U.S. aid allocation after 2001, but the focus on failing states in the U.S.’s 
national security policy during the War on Terror and the corresponding aid allocation 
pattern during this period should not be ignored. Many questions remain unanswered 
regarding the War on Terror’s effect on U.S. aid. If the War on Terror has affected U.S. 
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foreign aid, how long will the focus on failing states remain for the U.S.? Will the War on 
Terror turn into the new Cold War, and if so, will Cold War tendencies for foreign aid 
allocation to the region be repeated? Will the U.S. continue to focus much of its aid 
budget on SSA, or will other regions take on more importance for U.S. aid allocation? 
How will the Obama administration apply foreign aid to the region? As the U.S. is facing 
future budget restraints due to its growing deficit, how will foreign aid be affected if 
budgets are cut?  
   As the answers to these questions remain unknown, study of the U.S.’s foreign aid 
practices must continue. Important studies on how U.S. foreign aid has been affected by 
the War on Terror must be undertaken, as well as studies on whether the U.S. is actually 
preventing states from failing through its foreign aid.  
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Correlation Matrix of all Variables 
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APPENDIX 2 
COMPLETE STATISTICAL RESULTS  
Complete Primary Partial Fixed Effects Models Results 
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Alternative Models Results with Additional Variables 
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APPENDIX 3 
SUPPLEMENTAL DATA 
Percent of Change in U.S. Annual Foreign Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa 
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